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ANTITRUST SUITS INVOLVING FOREIGN COMMERCE:
SUGGESTIONS FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM
ERIKA NIJENHUISt
In an economically interdependent world in which nations pursue
differing economic policies, conflicts between differing economic norms
are inevitable. Because antitrust laws embody and enforce the ideal of
free competition, which has never been as warmly embraced by
America's trading partners as it has in this country, enforcement of the
American antitrust laws has provoked resistance by other countries."
This conflict has both a substantive and a procedural aspect. Al-
though there is no sharp line between procedure and substance, as both
affect parties' rights, a distinction nevertheless can be made between
what the antitrust laws forbid and how parties' rights are adjudicated
under those laws. Although the underlying conflict concerns substantive
law, much of the resistance focuses on procedural aspects of antitrust
enforcement.2 One of the features that faces the strongest objections is
t B.A. 1982, M.S. 1982, University of Pennsylvania; Diploma 1983, Oxford Uni-
versity; J.D. Candidate 1987, University of Pennsylvania.
I For a discussion of the clash over substantive goals, see for example, Atwood,
Extraterritorial Discovery: The Special Case of Antitrust, in EXTRATEkRrrORIAL
DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 319, 324-27 (1984). Cases in which
there has been strong resistance include: Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
Contracts Litigation, 570 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Watchmakers of
Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C.
1960); United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); In re Investiga-
tion of World Arrangements with Relation to the Prod., Transp., Ref. & Distrib. of
Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum
Addressed to Canadian Int'l Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
2 See Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial Application of the United States
Antitrust Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 350, 355 (1983). For an example of a legisla-
tive attempt to address the procedural aspects of antitrust enforcement in the interna-
tional area, see The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985: Hearings on
S.397 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter Hearings].
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the relatively broad view American courts take of their jurisdiction over
antitrust claims.' Other objections stem from the nature of American
discovery,4 fee arrangements, 5 the availability of jury trials,6 and the
treble damages remedy.'
Although no unilateral action on the part of the United States,
short of abandoning our commitment to antitrust enforcement, would
remove all objections, America can act to reduce the friction generated
by application of the antitrust laws to foreign commerce. Such action
would serve as a symbol of America's commitment to work with our
allies to resolve a mutual problem. Reform in this area should address
and alleviate specific areas of conflict, and should encourage other
countries to move toward accommodation, rather than increasing con-
frontation.' While suggestions as to how this problem can be alleviated
are not wanting, there is a tendency to offer them without adequate
consideration of how they are likely to be perceived abroad, which
makes the task of ascertaining whether they will have the desired im-
pact problematic. This Comment attempts to remedy that neglect by
approaching the problem from a transnational viewpoint. Part I exam-
ines the conflict over antitrust enforcement in its current context. Part
II briefly discusses some of the specific criticisms made by other nations
of American antitrust laws, and Part III summarizes the steps that
have been taken by the United States thus far to remedy the problem.
Finally, Part IV suggests several provisions that may help to minimize
the conflicts that increasing economic interdependence will otherwise
bring.
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM
The conflict over antitrust enforcement is part of a broader pattern
of clashes of economic interests between America and its trading part-
ners." Trade provides a model for accommodating the different interests
I See Shenefield, supra note 2, at 354.
4 See ABA Probes Comparative Analysis of U.S., EC Competition Enforcement,
49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1226, at 263 (Aug. 1, 1985) [hereinafter
ABA Probe]; Shenefield, supra note 2, at 355.
5 See Shenefield, supra note 2, at 355.
6 See ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 263.
' See id. at 263; Shenefield, supra note 2, at 355.
1 See ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 264 (predicting that blocking legislation will be
repealed when foreign governments "perceive that the procedures in U.S. antitrust
cases are fair").
See Shultz, Trade, Interdependence and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 36 S.C.L.
REv. 295, 296 (1985) (stating that conflicts over jurisdiction, oil shocks, monetary dis-
putes, and protectionist pressures are threats to the postwar economic system).
Other areas of conflict stem from American trade and securities laws, see Judg-
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of the United States and other countries in this area; the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs has largely channeled and controlled
trade disputes.10 It is generally agreed that an international meeting is
necessary to establish international guidelines on substantive antitrust
policy." But such a meeting seems unlikely in the near future,12 be-
cause the developed countries cannot agree among themselves what the
proper goals of antitrust laws should be,"3 and developing countries ap-
proach the question from a related but different perspective. 4 It is nec-
ment of May 22, 1965, cour d'appel, Paris, 1968 Receil Dalloz-Sirez, Jurisprudence
[D.S. Jur.] 147; ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 262; the unitary tax system, see Shultz,
supra, at 296-97; and the use of economic sanctions for foreign policy reasons. See, e.g.,
47 Fed Reg. 27,250.(June 24, 1982), amending 15 C.F.R. §§ 376.12, 379.8 & 385.2
(1982), repealed 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (Nov. 18, 1982) (regulations intended to ensure
that no American technology was used to build a Soviet pipeline to Western Europe);
see also Atwood, The Export Administration Act and the Dresser Industries Case, 15
LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1157 (1983) (discussing the controversy in light of the case
against Dresser Industries); Zaucha, The Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The Extraterrito-
rial Application of U.S. Export Controls, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1169 (1983)
(discussing economic and political implications of the pipeline controversy). Although
these regulations were quickly repealed, the damage had already been done. See ABA
Probe, supra note 4, at 262; Shenefield, supra note 2, at 351; Shultz, supra, at 297.
10 See G. CURZON, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND
ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND TECHNIQUES 313 (1965).
I' See, e.g., Dunfee & Friedman, The Extraterritorial Application of United
States Antitrust Laws: A Proposal for an Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 883
(1984); Shenefield, supra note 2, at 350.
12 See ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 264. The closest thing to substantive competi-
tion guidelines is the UN-sponsored Set of Mutually Agreed Equitable Principles and
Rules for Control of International Restrictive Business Practices. U.N. Doc. TD/
RBP/Conf/10 (1980). These "principles and rules" are nonbinding and contain no
enforcement mechanism.
"s While the promotion of competition is the major goal of American antitrust
law, the European Economic Community's competition policy, for example, has both
competitive and integrative goals, and the goal of integrating the economies of the mem-
ber countries is the more important of the two. Also, the Community modifies its anti-
trust enforcement to reflect "social" and "human" demands. See 2 B. HAWK, UNITED
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE
GUIDE 1, 7-8 (1986). To take another example, Australia has preferred predictability
and market penetration to the achievement of economic efficiency. See Cira, The Chal-
lenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247,
252-56 (1982).
The policies of individual European countries also vary widely. See A. HERMANN,
CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL LAWS WITH INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS Acrwr 45-46
(1982) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of cartels as instruments of national
policy and summarizing policies of Western European nations).
14 Antitrust laws in developing countries generally are accompanied by laws re-
stricting technology transfer, reflecting the need to control the potential threat posed by
external economic power, and the desire to encourage investment, budget balancing,
and the use of local technology, raw materials, and labor. See United Nations Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3281 (1975), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251, 255 (1975);
Fikentscher, Third World Trade Partnership: Supranational Authority vs. National
Extraterritorial Antitrust-A Plea for "Harmonized" Regionalism, 82 MICH. L.
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essary, then, to identify smaller steps that can be taken to bring about a
climate in which such a meeting could take place.
Coherent analysis requires that the victims of the current conflict
over antitrust enforcement, and the goals of an interim solution, be es-
tablished. There are three principal victims of the economic and politi-
cal tensions caused by conflicts over antitrust enforcement: American
business, especially companies with operations abroad; America's rela-
tions with its trading partners; and the international legal system.
American muitinational corporations are affected in. a number of
ways. They are subject to regulation both by the United States and by
foreign countries, and may find these regulations in conflict. 5 Because
American antitrust laws are more effectively enforced against American
corporations, American firms are less competitive than they would be if
they could operate under local law alone,"8 while their foreign competi-
tors are shielded by their respective governments.11 Less tangibly, the
long reach of American antitrust laws, and the resistance they provoke
abroad, has a spillover effect." A government that is futilely protesting
REV. 1489, 1494-98 (1984).
15 See 131 CONG. REc. S.1160 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini).
1" A study of 19 major American multinational corporations with high foreign
sales found that
[a]ntitrust caused companies either not to enter markets alone or to forego
opportunities to do so with others. Less frequently, companies entered
markets in less profitable ways than, but for antitrust, they would have
chosen voluntarily, or they stayed in markets that, but for antitrust, could
have been more profitable to them. The conclusion is that antitrust has
made [American multinationals] less competitive abroad.
J. TOWNSEND, EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST: THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST Acr
AND U.S. BUSINESS ABROAD 251 (1980). In contrast, foreign competitors enjoyed rela-
tive freedom. See id. at 190. But see Rahl, International Application of American
Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 336, 352-54 (1980)
(arguing that American businesses engaged in foreign commerce have benefitted sub-
stantially from the antitrust laws because the laws were instrumental in destroying
post-World War II global cartels).
17 See Shenefield, supra note 2, at 357. In the early 1970's, the United States
Chamber of Commerce conducted an inquiry into the effects of the antitrust laws on
international trade and investment. It concluded that United States antitrust laws are
"unfairly burdensome" for American exporters. See ANTITRUST TASK FORCE ON IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT ON U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS AND AMERICAN Ex-
PORTS (Feb. 26, 1974), reprinted in International Aspects of Antitrust Laws: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust.and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 163 (1973-1974).
18 One commentator has noted an "already noticeable anti-American cast to the
[European] Community's antitrust [enforcement]" and warned that "U.S. business
must, therefore, be prepared for ever-increasing legal hurdles in the prime European
market. Such a forecast . . . portends even more lost opportunities as commerce in-
creases." J. TOWNSEND, supra note 16, at 252.
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the existence of an antitrust suit against one of its corporations may be
less likely to welcome affiliates of American companies than one that is
not.19
The conflict over antitrust enforcement interferes with American
foreign relations in both the short and the long run20 Individual flare-
ups disturb the amicable ties between America and its trading partners
and have led to the enactment of numerous statutes specifically
designed to frustrate the commands of American courts in antitrust and
other suits.2 1 "Blocking" laws prevent documents located abroad from
being used in American litigation,22 and "clawback" laws enable for-
eign corporations to recover all or part of antitrust treble damage
awards paid pursuant to an American court judgment.2 3 More seri-
19 But see Shenefield, supra note 2, at 357 (deriding as a myth the belief that
American antitrust laws put American business at a disadvantage abroad).
20 In one representative year, "the United States . . . received well over two
dozen formal and high level demarches on such issues [as extraterritoriality and discov-
ery of documents located abroad] and [saw] . . .them intrude into the highest level of
intergovernmental meetings. . . . [T]hey. . . [are] and remain among the most impor-
tant politico-legal issues facing the [State Department's] Office of the Legal Advisor."
Robinson, Compelling Discovery and Evidence in International Litigation, 18 INT'L
LAW. 533, 533 (1984); see also 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTrrRuST AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 4.15 (2d ed. 1981) (stating that protests over antitrust
laws are raised at almost every meeting between American and European economic
officials).
21 See Hearings, supra note 2, at 6 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Ad-
visor, Department of State); Rosenthal,Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Sovereign Na-
tions, 19 INT'L LAW. 487, 491 n.22 (1985).
"2 Among the most important blocking laws are: Act of Dec. 20, 1984, ch. 49,
1984 CAN. STAT. 1863, reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 794 (1985); Protec-
tion of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (U.K.), reprinted in EXTRATERRITORIAL
DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 309-18 (Practising Law Institute 1984);
Act of May 24, 1965, § 11, [1965] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1], Teil II 833 (W. Ger.).
For other examples, see Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act of
1976, No. 121, 1976 Austl. Acts 1125, amended by No. 202, id. at 1743; Law of July
16, 1980, [1980] Journal Officiel de la Rgpublique Frangais [J.O.] 1799, 1980 Recueil
Dalloz-Sirez, Ligislation [D.S.L.] 285; Presidential Decree No. 1718, 74 Philippine
Presidential Decrees 58 (August 21, 1980); Evidence Amendment Act (No. 2), N.Z.
Stat. No. 27 (1980).
Most blocking laws merely prevent documents and information located within the
country in question from being released. A number of them go further, and direct their
nationals not to comply with United States laws that conflict with international law.
See Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 491 n.22.
2S See, e.g., Act of Dec. 20, 1984, ch. 49, 1984 Can. Stat. 1863, reprinted in 24
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 794 (1985) Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11
(U.K.).
A number of countries have passed legislation enabling their executive to bar en-
forcement of foreign antitrust judgments. See, e.g., Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Re-
strictions of Enforcement) Act 1979, No. 13, 1979 Austl. Acts 142; Evidence Amend-
ment Act (No. 2), N.Z. Stat. No. 27 (1980), § 484. The British Protection of Trading
Interests Act is particularly restrictive. It does not permit .recovery of any part of a
multiple damages claim, including merely compensatory damages. See Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 5 (U.K.), reprinted in Lightman & Sharpe,
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ously, antitrust and other areas of economic conflict jeopardize the in-
tricate network of economic and political ties that bind America and its
allies.24 Although that network is not seriously endangered, each indi-
vidual antitrust suit that sparks protest unravels it to some extent.
The international legal system also suffers gravely. There is no
international full faith and credit clause, and no enforcement mecha-
nism to require the recognition of foreign judgments.25 The system is
founded on cooperation and respect for the interests of other nations.2"
The recent spectacle in the Laker litigation of the early 1980's, in
which American and British courts usurped each other's jurisdiction
and issued conflicting orders, is a sign of breakdown. 27 Although for-
eign governments thus far have exercised their authority under blocking
and clawback laws rarely,28 the prospect of widespread international
defiance of orders of the American judiciary is extremely troubling.
Until recently, only American antitrust suits generated interna-
tional protest. This is no longer the case. Actions brought in German 9
Discovery for the United Kingdom: A British Perspective, in EXTRATERRITORIAL Dis-
COVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 309-18 (Practising Law Institute 1984).
" See Shultz, supra note 9, at 302.
2 One of the features that distinguishes international law from other bodies of
law is the absence of any centralized enforcement mechanism. Although the United
Nations has nominal power to enforce the peace, and international organizations can
deny benefits to their members, see M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7 (4th ed. 1982), international law is largely self-regulating.
See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 49-68 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing reasons why
nations choose to obey international law).
2 Maier has described the international legal system as a flexible "demand-re-
sponse-accommodation process," in which each nation makes decisions that further its
own self-interest by encouraging the development of an effective international dispute-
resolution system. Sacrificing short-term interests to promote this long-term interest is
necessary if the system is to work, although it is understood that no nation can be
expected to sacrifice interests central to its sovereignty. See Maier, Extraterritorial Ju-
risdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International
Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982).
27 Defendants in an air transport antitrust suit filed in the District of Columbia
District Court obtained an injunction from a British court that prohibited the plaintiff,
a British corporation, from continuing the suit. The District Court then issued an in-
junction against the defendants, enjoining them from getting further antisuit injunc-
tions. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed. The House of Lords ultimately lifted the
British injunction. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 559 F.
Supp. 1124 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd.,
[1983] 3 W.L.R. 545 (C.A.), rev'd, [1985] 1 App. Cas. 58.
28 The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, for example, was applied only
once in its first two years of existence. See Cira, supra note 13, at 251 & n.28. Block-
ing and clawback laws are generally described as measures of last resort. See, e.g.,
Canadian Government Sponsors Bill to Address Extraterritoriality Issue, 46 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1168, at 1106 (June 7, 1984).
" See Kammergericht, Decisions I and II, Nov. 26, 1980, WIRTSCHAFT UND
WETrBEWERB/ENTSCHEIDUNGSSAMMLUNG OLG 2411 (1980) (Bayer/Firestone v.
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courts and the Court of Justice of the European Communities, ° in
which jurisdiction has been based on an American-influenced broad ju-
risdictional test instead of a traditionally narrow European approach,
have sparked protest as well. In fact, the United States has been one of
the protesters."1 Developing countries have also expressed interest in
far-reaching antitrust regulation to protect their lesser developed mar-
kets from domination by foreign multinationals. 2
This new development poses both a danger and an opportunity.
Increased use of a broad jurisdictional test based on the American
model will lead to increased conflict, 3 but recognition of the potential
chaos may help pressure the United States and other countries into
seeking an international agreement of wider scope than those that cur-
rently exist.
An interim solution should have two effects: it should reduce the
gratuitous conflicts resulting from the manner in which the antitrust
laws are enforced, and it should do so in such a way as to reinforce the
international legal system. Achieving the first goal requires that sug-
gested solutions address the specific features of antitrust procedures that
cause other countries the most distress. The second requires that modi-
fications of the antitrust laws increase the predictability and acceptabil-
ity of the application of American antitrust law to foreign parties."
It should also be noted that the United States government takes the
conflict over antitrust enforcement seriously. Each branch has worked
to reduce friction, as detailed below, but no satisfactory solution has yet
Federal Cartel Office); Kammergericht, Decisions of July 1, 1983, WIRTSCHAFr UND
WETTBEWERB/ ENTSCHEIDUNGSSAMMLUNG OLG 3051 (1983) (Morris/Rothmans v.
Federal Cartel Office).
" See Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission des Communaut~s Europeennes, 18
Recueil 619, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161 (1972).
The European Court of Justice applies not only the "effects" doctrine, but also the
"economic entity" test and the concept of imputing the behavior of a subsidiary to a
parent corporation to determine jurisdiction. See Heck, Transnational Litiga-
tion-Part II: Perspectives from the United States and Abroad, Federal Republic of
Germany and the EEC, 18 IN'VL LAw. 793, 801 (Fall 1984).
"i See Reagan Administration Keeps Tabs on Progress of EC Antitrust Probe of
IBM, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1164, at 934 (May 10, 1984). The
case at issue is IBM v. Commission of the European Community, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 81, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) T 8708 (1981).
32 Most developing countries do not yet have to confront the dangers posed by
internal concentrations of economic power. They are, on the other hand, continually
confronted with the need to control the dangers posed by external economic power.
Thus, their antitrust laws are typically accompanied by laws restricting market free-
dom in the area of technology transfer. See Fikentscher, supra note 14, at 1497.
" See A. HERMANN, supra note 13, at 15-18 (painting a grim picture of a world
in which other countries with far-reaching legislation attempt to apply their laws to
extraterritorial conduct).
" See Maier, supra note 26, at 280.
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emerged.
II. AREAS OF CONFLICT
The fundamental objection to the enforcement of American anti-
trust laws abroad is that such laws infringe on foreign sovereignty. 35
Procedural aspects of American antitrust enforcement are viewed as
unfairly favoring plaintiffs," and foreign parties are often defendants.
37
Four of the most important procedural features of American antitrust
enforcement that offend foreign sensibilities are the breadth of the
American approach to jurisdiction in antitrust cases, the intrusiveness
of American discovery, the availability of a private remedy for antitrust
violations, and the penal effect of treble damage awards.
A. Jurisdiction: The Effects Test
An American court has statutory jurisdiction over an antitrust case
when the defendant's conduct has had a "direct, substantial and reason-
ably foreseeable effect" 38 on American commerce. The defendant's na-
tionality, the location of the conduct causing the antitrust violation, and
any other link between the United States and the defendant, are not
crucial; the requisite effect suffices. This approach either is rejected
outright" or applied far more narrowly by foreign countries.40 It is, in
a sense, the heart of the "procedural" differences to which others object,
because if American courts asserted jurisdiction more narrowly,41 as
11 See Beckett, Transnational Litigation-Part II: Perspectives from the United
States and Abroad, United Kingdom, 18 INT'L LAW. 773, 773 (Fall 1984); Robinson,
supra note 20, at 534.
3' See Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730,
734 (C.A.) (describing American system as one in which "the plaintiff holds all the
cards"); infra notes 102 and 105 and accompanying text for discussion of pro-plaintiff
aspects of the antitrust laws.
3' See Beckett, supra note 35, at 774.
" Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 6a
(1982).
39 See Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 490. The British are the most vehemently
opposed to the effects test. See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
[1978] 1 App. Cas. 547, 617; Wilkey, Transnational Litigation-Part II: Perspectives
from the U.S. and Abroad, United States of America, 18 INT'L LAW. 779, 780 (1984).
40 Recent cases in Germany and the European Economic Community have at-
tempted to regulate extraterritorial conduct but have not tried to govern conduct abroad
in conflict with the law or policy of the foreign jurisdiction. See Meessen, Antitrust
Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 797
(1984); see, e.g., Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission des Communaut~s Europen-
nes, 18 Recueil 619, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt Rep. (CCH) 18161
(1972) (involving the concerted fixing, outside the Common Market, of prices within
the Market).
" See Wilkey, supra note 39, at 780-84 (discussing Laker in relation to the
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foreign courts do,42 many controversial cases would never be heard.43
The "effects test" recognizes the futility of trying to allocate juris-
diction to any single nation over acts by multinationals in an interna-
tional economy.44 To permit economic activity to go unmonitored if the
actor is a foreign national or if the activity in question takes place
abroad would be to forego substantial control over one's own economy
and make effective enforcement of antitrust laws impossible.45
As applied, however, the "effects test" has permitted American
breadth of American jurisdiction).
42 The two principal bases of jurisdiction in international law are territoriality
and nationality. Nations have the right to control acts within their territory and acts by
their citizens. Territoriality is the most common basis for asserting jurisdiction. See
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 comment b (Tent. Draft No. 6), (1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
The objective territoriality principle, an extended version of territoriality jurisdic-
tion, also asserts jurisdiction over acts that take place outside the nation in question but
have effects inside. It is generally accepted when applied to shooting bullets, or sending
defective products or libelous publications, for example, across borders. See id. at com-
ment d.
A number of countries, including the United States, Canada, and West Germany,
claim a much more extended version of this "effects" jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. § 6a
(1982); Combines Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 23 (1970), amended by ch.
76, 1974-1976 Can. Stat. 1535; Gesetz Gegen Wettbewerbschraenkigung (Act against
Restraints of Competition) § 98(2), 1957 BGBI.I 1081 (W. Ger.). These laws gener-
ally grant jurisdiction over conduct that has substantial anticompetitive effects in the
country in question. The European Community Commission, which enforces the anti-
trust articles of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, also
claims jurisdiction under an effects test. See Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958, art. 85(1), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48.
Moreover, both international law and foreign municipal law recognize conduct taking
place within a country as the primary basis for conferring jurisdiction, superseding
concurrent jurisdiction by other states. Only the United States considers territoriality to
be a basis for jurisdiction that is merely equal to other bases. See Rosenthal, supra note
21, at 490. As a consequence of these different approaches to jurisdiction, the United
States is "viewed abroad as a 'rogue elephant.'" Id. at 493.
43 The nonlimiting nature of the effects test is clear; of the 248 foreign trade anti-
trust cases filed by the Justice Department up to May 1973, none were dismissed for
want of jurisdiction. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 608 n.12 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COM-
MERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS app. B, at 498 (2d ed. 1973)). Dismissals of pri-
vate cases for lack of jurisdiction were also rare. See id; see also 1 J. ATWOOD & K.
BREWSTER, supra note 20, § 6.06 ("[Tjhere are no reported decisions dismissing a
government antitrust action on jurisdictional grounds and remarkably few dismissing
private actions.").
" In most antitrust cases, it is likely that more than one nation will be able to
claim jurisdiction under either the territorial or the effects principle. See Meessen,
supra note 40, at 801; see also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,
731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("As surely as people, products and problems
move freely among adjoining countries, so national interests cross territorial borders.");
Robinson, supra note 20, at 537 ("[T]he search for a single authoritative jurisdiction in
each situation, as a matter of law, by means of a complex balancing process, is neither
the law as it stands, nor a promising reform.").
4 See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 923.
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courts to assert jurisdiction over claims in which the activity in question
has had a greater impact on countries other than the United States."' In
some cases, the acts that form the basis of the American suit are not
violations of the antitrust laws of the defendant's home country or the
country in which the acts took place.4 In other cases, a foreign govern-
ment has approved of and even encouraged the acts in question. The
Westinghouse litigation,48 for example, was the result of attempts by
uranium-producing countries to control the world market for this valu-
able national resource, in part by requiring the defendant corporations
to work together. German courts and the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Community also take jurisdiction under versions of the "effects
test,"4' 9 but these courts have been considerably more restrained in their
application of the doctrine.50
Other countries, notably Great Britain, object to the "effects" ap-
proach in principle as well as in practice.51 Once again, their objections
stem from the issue of national sovereignty. British control over their
own subjects is infringed when American courts assert jurisdiction over
them. To some extent this is inevitable whenever a court of one nation
asserts jurisdiction over a foreign national. But the British claim that
46 See, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (jurisdiction based on exclusion of United States shipper from carry-
ing merchandise between Taiwan and South Vietnam on ground that export of Ameri-
can shipping services affected), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Dominicus Ameri-
cana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) Ourisdiction based
on monopolization of tourist facilities in the Dominican Republic on grounds that "ex-
port" of American tourists affected); see also Timberlane v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 579, 610-11, 613, 615 (9th Cir. 1979) (indicating that it is
probably not necessary for the effect on foreign commerce to be both substantial and
direct as long as it is not de minimis); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
(ALCOA), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting that even wholly foreign conduct may
come within the sweep of the antitrust laws if it has sufficient effect on the interstate or
foreign commerce of the United States).
47 See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 704-05 (1962); United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio
1954), affld per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
48 In re Uranium Antitrust Litig. (Westinghouse Ele6. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.),
617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts
Litig., 570 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1978).
4 The European Economic Community claims to have jurisdiction over cases in
which there is a direct and immediate restriction of competition within the Community,
and where this effect is substantial and was reasonably foreseeable. See Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958, art. 85(1),
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48. The German law is the Gesetz Gegen Wettbewerb-
schraenkignng (Act against Restraints of Competition) § 98(2), 1957 BGBI.I 1081.
Australian antitrust law also provides for jurisdiction based on effects, although in
a very restricted form. See Trade Practices Act 1974, No. 51, 1974 Austl. Acts 397.
50 See Cira, supra note 13, at 252 (stating that enforcement of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by Australia is "sparse").
51 See ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 262.
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under international law effects jurisdiction may not be extended to the
antitrust context.52 They recognize only the narrower approach as
valid.5" The British object, then, when "invalid" claims of jurisdiction
are invoked to inflict upon British subjects the other objectionable fea-
tures of American antitrust enforcement.
B. Discovery
Foreigners often consider American discovery to be little more
than a "fishing expedition."" This assessment is not unreasonable;
there is also considerable domestic dissatisfaction with the scope of dis-
covery.55 Of the various objectionable features of American antitrust
52 This opposition stems not so much from a doctrinaire rejection of the objective
territoriality principle as from the belief that it can be applied only when there is
international consensus that a wrong has been committed, when standards of proof are
clear, and when the remedies are considered appropriate by international standards. See
Lightman & Sharpe, supra note 23, at 301-02.
53 See Beckett, supra note 35, at 774.
" See Cutler, Discovery from England: A U.S. Perspective, in EXTRATERRrro-
RIAL DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 261, 267 (Practising Law Inst.,
1984). For some particularly scathing critiques from this viewpoint, see Rio Tinto Zinc
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 App. Cas 547, 617; Radio Corp. of
America v. Rauland Corp, [1956] 1 All E.R. 549, 551 (Q.B.).
5 The evidence on the excessive demands made by antitrust discovery is both an-
ecdotal and statistical. Practitioners on both sides of the bar have made their unhappi-
ness with the burdensomeness of antitrust discovery clear. See, e.g., Byrnes, Discovery:
Its Uses and Abuses-The Defendants' Perspective, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 14, 24-25
(1974); Kurland, Discovery: Its Uses and Abuses-The Plaintiffs Perspective, 44 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 3, 3-4 (1974). See generally D. SEGAL, SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
ON DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT: EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION AND
PROPOSED REFORMS 10-12 (1978) (describing the problem of abuse of discovery as one
of two main subjects of discovery literature, and summarizing criticisms).
Stories of individual cases in which discovery was so lengthy and voluminous as to
be close to indigestible abound. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW
OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Jan. 22, 1979, at 42 [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION RE-
PORT] (discussing three cases: the IBM case, which lasted more than 10 years and
involved millions of documents; a case involving Xerox, in which the pretrial stage took
four years and involved hundreds of thousands of documents; and a case against East-
man Kodak in which the pretrial stage lasted four and one-half years).
Finally, statistics bear out the belief that antitrust suits are more burdensome than
other kinds of cases, although they do not speak to the appropriateness of the burden.
Data collected by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts shows, for example, that
civil antitrust suits represented 0.9% of the filed suits in 1980, but 4.1% of suits pend-
ing three years or more, see 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS [hereinafter 1980 ANNUAL REPORT],
quoted in W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGA-
TION 13-14 (1982), and the median time to disposition of private antitrust suits is twice
as long as that for civil cases generally. See 1973-1983 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, analyzed in Salop
& White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1009
(1986) (median length of private antitrust case is approximately 17 months; median
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law, this one has elicited the most dramatic response: sixteen countries
have enacted laws designed solely to block American discovery.
56
Modern American discovery is the result of the particular form of
the adversary system that exists in the United States: the focus on
courts as agents of justice and the belief that cases are best managed by
the parties.57 Because the courts are viewed as agents of justice, rather
than as dispute-settlers, the weight given to each parties' interest in not
aiding its opponent is reduced. Additionally, the importance of arriving
at the truth of the matter is emphasized. Surprise is regarded as highly
undesirable because of its tendency to incapacitate the other party from
placing the matter in its true light, and the liberal discovery rules used
in most state and federal courts have succeeded in reducing, if not elim-
inating, trial victories based on surprise tactics.58 Consequently, the
pre-trial stage of litigation has become a relatively long, drawn-out, and
detail-conscious process.5" Concommitantly, the belief that parties can
best manage their own cases has led to little judicial involvement in the
discovery process, at least until recently.
American discovery is exemplified by Rule 26(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action . . . ."" This was designed to be a very broad
rule."1 It permits a party to discover whether there exist certain facts or
documents, as long as "the information sought appears reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."'6 2 In effect, par-
length of private non-antitrust case generally is nine months). Futhermore, approxi-
mately one-sixth of the antitrust cases in that study were complex multidistrict litiga-
tions; these cases averaged 5.7 years in duration. See id.
56 See Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 491; see also Cira, supra note 13, at 247-60
(discussing the blocking laws of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, France,
Canada, and the Philippines).
57 See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 1.1-.2
(1985).
" See id. § 7.1.
5 See id. §§ 7.2, 7.18.
60 FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rules 33 (interrogatories) and 34 (production of doc-
uments) incorporate the same standard. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b), 34(a).
61 See generally P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KULMAN, JUDICIAL CON-
TROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 5-17 (1978) (discussing
sources of modem discovery rules and practice); W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 26-37 (1968) (same); Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1057 (1955) (describing
dual purpose of the Rules as intended to lead to the resolution of cases on their merits
rather than on technicalities, and to the conduct of trials as endeavors to ascertain the
truth rather than contests of skill).
*' FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Rule includes "the existence. . . of any [rele-
vant] books, documents, or other tangible things" as a permissible subject of discovery."
Id.
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ties can use discovery to shape their arguments and to determine the
strength of the other party's position. Moreover, the breadth of the
Rule's language is given even greater scope by the prevailing judicial
approach of liberal construction."
European discovery is very different. It is rooted in a system in
which the role of the courts is considerably less prominent." The
search for truth is achieved by strong judicial control over the evidence-
seeking process, which protects parties against the danger of providing
ammunition to their opponents while ensuring that the facts necessary
to decide the dispute are revealed."5 The primacy of judicial control is
strengthened by the absence of jury trials in civil cases; 6 as a result,
trials are not dramatic attempts by parties to influence lay judgment,
but a series of hearings in which witnesses are questioned as to their
knowledge of the facts of the dispute.67 There is virtually no pre-trial
stage; a lawyer will discuss the case with her client, do her research,
and interview witnesses. Generally, lawyers may not question witnesses
at trial.68
Thus, discovery is taken largely by judges themselves. It is nar-
rowly focused on the issues at bar because it is done during the trial,
and it is highly protective of the parties. Moreover, it is embedded in a
theory of law that makes discovery a matter of judicial sovereignty; con-
trolling discovery is an essential part of a judge's role.69 American dis-
e3 See Hickman v. Taylor, 392 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); NATIONAL COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 55, at 43-44; see also Scope of Discovery: National Commission
Staff Papers, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1063, 1067 (1979) (stating that trial court rulings on
discovery favor broad construction of the Rules because a contrary ruling is likely to be
reversed).
" See generally J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 35-39 (2d ed.
1985) (describing the court in a civil law system as a "faceless unit" and the judges as
"operators of the law" who perform a mechanical function, plugging the facts of the
case into the present legislative responses).
65 See id. at 122.
6 See id. at 121.
67 For the German practice, see Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of Ger-
man Civil Procedure 1, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1211-12 (1958).
68 A modified form of this practice exists in Italy; only the judge may question
witnesses, but the questions she asks are those submitted by the parties. See M. CAP-
PELLET'rTI & J. PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY 223 (1965) (Columbia Univer-
sity School of Law Project on International Procedure, Hans Smit ed.)
69 See 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 20, § 15.10. Because judges
are officers of the state, discovery is considered an official act. See Frei, Transnational
Litigation-Part II: Perspectives from the United States and Abroad, Switzerland, 18
INT'L LAW. 789, 789 (Fall 1984); Report of the United States Delegation to Eleventh
Session of Hague Conference on Private International Law, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS 785, 806-07 (1969). In addition to the procedural protections offered by judicial
control of the discovery process, the civil law system provides substantive protections to
parties of a kind and degree unknown in the United States. See 2 J. ATWOOD & K.
BREWSTER, supra note 20, § 15.10; see also Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra
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covery, therefore, is seen as intrusive, overbroad, and lacking official
sanction. Antitrust cases are particularly offensive, not only because
they call for documents, the most restricted form of discovery under the
civil system,7 0 but because they call for so many documents.
If American courts restricted requests for documents to those lo-
cated within the United States, the American approach to discovery
might be considered merely an inevitable burden that goes along with
doing business in the United States. But American courts have not so
limited document requests. Foreign citizens have been required to pro-
duce documents located at home under circumstances where local laws
do not require, and even forbid, their production.71 Thus, American
discovery is perceived by foreigners as a tool that can be used to under-
mine a country's sovereignty.
72
This challenge to national sovereignty has brought the "blocking
laws" into existence. These laws have exacerbated the problem; 7 ' a cor-
poration may now find itself compelled by an American court to pro-
duce documents located abroad, while a court in the country in which
the documents are located may forbid it to do so under the authority of
note 67, at 1237-39 (discussing German family, public official, professional, and self-
incrimination privileges).
70 In France, for example, discovery of documents by an opposing party generally
is limited to commercial books of account. See P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN
FRANCE 233 & n.6 (1967) (Columbia University School of Law Project on Interna-
tional Procedure, Hans Smit ed.). In Italy, documents may he discovered only if they
are specifically indicated, established as indispensible to determine the facts of the case,
and in the possession of the other party. See M. CAPPELLETTI & J. PERILLO, supra
note 68, at 236. In Germany, documents are produced only by order of a court, either
at the court's discretion to clarify contested material issues of fact, or on party motion
where the party has a right to demand them under substantive law, or where the op-
posing party has offered them as proof. See Kaplan, von Mehren, & Schaefer, supra
note 67, at 1232, 1239-41.
" See, e.g., Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerci-
ales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324,
1329-33 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v.
Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951, 952-53 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Arthur
Anderson & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1096 (1977); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01
(2d Cir. 1968).
71 A diplomatic note from the Canadian government, for example, protested that
imposition of discovery sanctions "would have the appearance of an attempt to induce
the performance in Canada of acts which are prohibited in Canada and of attaching
liability for acts performed in Canada in accordance with Canadian law and the pub-
licly declared policy of the Canadian government." Canadian Practice in Interna-
tional Law During 1978 as Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and State-
ments of the Department of External Affairs, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L 334, 337-38 (1979)
(Note of Nov. 8, 1978 from the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs to the
U.S. Ambassador in Ottawa).
78 See ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 262.
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a blocking law. 4
0. The Private Remedy
American antitrust laws are enforced by three agents: the Depart-
ment of Justice, 7 5 the Federal Trade Commission,"6 and private plain-
tiffs.77 The United States is the only country in which control of the
economy through enforcement of antitrust law is allowed to rest in pri-
vate hands.78 In other countries, control generally rests in the hands of
government agencies."' American antitrust law, moreover, is doubly
anomalous; it not only provides for a private remedy, it also permits
suits for damages.
Private enforcement is a fundamental part of general antitrust en-
forcement.80 The Sherman Act was enacted in part to enable individu-
als to restrain competitors who were preventing the market from acting
freely." Multiple damages were provided as a further incentive to indi-
viduals who were considering bringing suit. 2 Subsequent amendments
to the antitrust laws have generally tended to make private enforcement
7" See, e.g., In re Societe Internationale Industrielle Aerospatiele, 782 F.2d 120
(8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
United States Dist. Court, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986); United States v. Bank of N.S., 740
F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 778 (1985).
Is 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 8 (1982).
Is 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), (b) (1982).
1 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982 & West Supp. 1986).
78 In the United Kingdom, for example, the only action directly available to pri-
vate plaintiffs is a tort action against acts intended to harm plaintiffs when done in
execution of agreements, rather than for the purpose of merely protecting one's own
interests. See Beckett, supra note 35, at 774.
Although the Japanese Antimonopoly Act grants victims of a cartel a cause of
action for private damages, it has been used by private parties only seven times since its
enactment in 1947. See Ramseyer, The Costs of Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforce-
ment and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 616-18
(1985).
" In Great Britain the responsible authorities are the Director General of Fair
Trading and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. See Beckett, supra note 35, at
774. In Japan, the Antimonopoly Act is enforced by the Fair Trade Commission. See
Ramseyer, supra note 78, at 616.
SO There were two rationales for providing a private remedy: deterrence of anti-
trust violations and indemnification of injury. See 21 CONG. REC. 2569 (1890) (state-
ment of Senator Sherman) (characterizing the private remedy provision as important
not only to regulate interstate commerce but also to indemnify an injured party).
S See id. at 2563 (Senator Sherman, agreeing with Senator Hoar's interpretation
of the private remedy provision as one that allows a private citizen to restrain those
who would keep "men from freely competing.").
82 The Sherman bill originally provided for double recovery. It was modified dur-
ing its consideration to provide for treble damages. See id. at 2569 (characterizing
double damages as too small).
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easier."3 As a result, the number of private antitrust suits has far out-
stripped the number of suits brought by the government." Although
suits brought by the government are more influential than private suits,
because a defendant who loses a government suit may not relitigate the
issue of liability in a subsequent private suit, the government, to a large
extent, has lost the ability to control enforcement of the antitrust laws."5
As is the case with discovery, private enforcement is not merely
distasteful to foreign nations; it also poses a challenge to national sover-
eignty. The Department of Justice generally considers the possible in-
ternational repercussions of bringing antitrust suits and may refrain
from bringing those suits likely to generate protest."8 Private plaintiffs,
however, are subject to no such restraints.8 7 Consequently, private suits
have caused several major international incidents since the 1950's,
among the most notable of which are the air transport and uranium
suits.88
From the perspective of the foreign nations involved, the effect of
these suits was to bring the power of the United States to bear in an
attempt to destroy the economic structure of a certain commodity or
service that that nation felt to be in its best interest.8" From the Ameri-
can perspective, on the other hand, these suits enabled plaintiffs to re-
cover for economic injuries inflicted upon them by foreign corporations
shielded by protective governments. More broadly, private suits serve to
9 See REPORT OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., 2D
SESS., STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGES REmEDY 6-9 (Comm. Print
1984) [hereinafter TREBLE DAMAGES STUDY].
" In the 1970's, more than 94% of the antitrust suits filed were private suits. See
Hills, Private Enforcement and Public Policy, quoted in ANTITRUST IN THE COM-
PETITIVE WORLD OF THE 1980's: EXPLORING OPTIONS 18 (1982) [hereinafter Ex-
PLORING OP'IONs]; 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, in W. SCHWARZER, supra note 55, at 13.
In the 1980's, the ratio of private suits to government actions dropped slightly; private
suits represented an average of 92% of total antitrust cases filed between 1980 and
1984.
85 See Hills, supra note 84, at 19.
86 See Shultz, supra note 9, at 307 ("[Wle will exercise... authority with discre-
tion and restraint, balancing all the important interests involved, American and foreign,
immediate and long term, economic and political.").
87 For a listing of the particular discovery problems raised by private antitrust
suits, see Atwood, supra note 1, at 352-53.
" See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig.- (Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio
Algom Ltd.), 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
" Consider the statement of a Canadian lawyer in the Federal External Affairs
Department: "[I]t shouldn't be up to private individuals to determine foreign policy
considerations for Canada [through American antitrust suits]." Canadian Government
Sponsors Bill to Address Exterritoriality Issue, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1168, at 1106 (June 7, 1984).
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preserve American competitiveness, without requiring the government
to bear the entire burden. This type of conflict is difficult to accept
when two national economic policies clash, but it is even more distaste-
ful when a private individual is permitted to trigger the conflict, espe-
cially because privately initiated conflicts are less amenable to
resolution.90
D. Treble Damages
The treble damages remedy is the centerpiece of the private anti-
trust remedy.91 It is also among the most objectionable features of
American antitrust enforcement92 and increasingly the target of criti-
cism at home.9" Although not to the same extent as discovery, the avail-
ability of treble damages has also caused the enactment of foreign laws
specifically designed to frustrate its intent.
9 4
The treble damages provision was intended to be a major incentive
to private plaintiffs, and there is some evidence that it is "the most, and
perhaps the only, effective deterrent under existing law."9' 5 One recent
comprehensive study, however, reached no firm conclusion as to the
remedy's effectiveness.' A number of proposals have been made to re-
90 Although the government controls the suits it brings, and therefore can shape its
prosecutions according to the response the suits generate abroad, the government has no
direct influence on cases brought by private plaintiffs. See ABA Probe, supra note 4, at
263 ("The most extreme difficulties occur in government negotiations over private
cases, ... ").
The treble damages remedy was enacted as § 7 of the Sherman Act. Its pur-
poses were to encourage plaintiffs other than large businesses to sue, to ensure that
those responsible were punished, and to deter violations of the antitrust laws. See
TREBLE DAMAGES STUDY, supra note 83, at 6-7; see also 2 P. AREEDA & D. TuR-
NER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR Appu-
CATIoN 311 (1978) (discussing treble damages as punitive).
92 See ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 263; Shenefield, supra note 2, at 356.
93 The treble damage remedy is criticized for the injustice of imposing punishment
when the defendants believed their actions were legal, for retarding the development of
antitrust law as a result of judicial reluctance to award treble damages, and for trivial-
izing antitrust suits by providing an incentive for recasting tort and contract suits as
antitrust suits. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 91, 331b2. The last
charge is borne out by empirical data; in 21.6% of the antitrust cases in the Ge-
orgetown Private Antitrust Litigation Project in which the central issue was not anti-
trust, the antitrust claims parallelled the other claims. Salop & White, supra note 55,
at 1048.
" See Beckett, supra note 35, at 775-78 (discussing monetary penalties, discovery,
and blocking legislation).
95 TREBLE DAMAGES STUDY, supra note 83, at 22.
"See Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEo. L.J. 1065, 1140 (1986);
Salop & White, supra note 55, at 1051. Bath articles are based on the Georgetown
Private Antitrust Litigation Project, a study that examined more than 2350 antitrust
suits filed over a 10-year period. Various aspects of the Project's findings are discussed
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duce the private damages remedy to double or actual damages,9" but
such proposals have been approved only in cases with limited
application.9"
American criticism of treble damages looks largely to their eco-
nomic impact.9" Treble damages are criticized as deterring socially ben-
eficial conduct. x00 For instance, the threat of a treble damages suit
raises the cost of an adverse judgment so dramatically that a corpora-
tion that might otherwise risk some limited and socially desirable coop-
eration with other firms will instead avoid it.x01 Treble damages are
also criticized as unfairly favoring plaintiffs who now have the benefit
of judicial and legislative rules that substantially ease their case. 02
in Symposium: Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 999-1236 (1986).
97 One proposal is to limit damages to actual damages "when the conduct giving
rise to the cause of action has been favorably reviewed by the Justice Department pur-
suant to an agreement with a foreign nation, or when trebling would jeopardize plain-
tiffs' rights to collect or retain a judgment under applicable foreign laws." TREBLE
DAMAGES STUDY, supra note 83, at 41.
Other suggestions are that the treble damage remedy should not apply when the
defendant reasonably relied on contemporary doctrine, and more generally, that it be
made entirely discretionary. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 91, 331b3.
The New York State Bar also has called for actual damages where the defendant could
not reasonably have known she was violating the law. See Report of Antitrust Section
Committee on Legislation, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 395, 395 (1982) [hereinafter Antitrust
Report].
The current administration also has proposed generally restricting the application
of treble damages. See S. 2162, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), 132 CONG. REc. S. 2284-
87 (daily ed. March 7, 1986).
9s See 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1982) (limiting to actual damages recovery of the United
States Government when it is injured in its business or property); Pfizer Act of 1982,
15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982) (limiting to actual damages recovery against foreign govern-
ments suing in their sovereign capacity); National Cooperative Research Act of 1984,
15 U.S.C. § 4303 (Supp. III 1985) (limiting to actual damages recovery against joint
research and development ventures that have properly notified the Attorney General
and the Federal Trade Commission).
99 Elzinga and Breit criticize the private remedy in general. They find it results in
the creation of "perverse incentives" (injured parties do not avoid injury inflicted on
them even when the cost of avoidance is less than the cost of the injury), a raising of
prices due to settlements agreed to by risk-averse businesses, and resources wasted in
determining and allocating damages. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST
PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMIcs 84-91 (1976). In addition, Elzinga
and Breit cite evidence that "treble damage suits represent a transfer of wealth from the
corporate sector to the legal profession." Id. at 75.
100 See, e.g., Dam, Implications for Antitrust of a Shrinking Globe, in EXPLOR-
ING OPTIONS, supra note 84, at 12-13 (treble damage remedy increases inefficiency);
Hills, supra note 84, at 18-20 (treble damages chill risk-taking, encourage baseless
claims and "soft" competition, extort settlements, and hinder the development of ra-
tional antitrust policy).
101 See TREBLE DAMAGES STUDY, supra note 83, at 34-39.
10' The damage multiplier has, in fact, been more than three, because the burden
of proof has been eased, the class of plaintiffs enlarged, the statute of limitations length-
ened, and consent decrees and pleas of nolo contendere in government suits made prima
facie evidence of guilt in private suits. See id. at 8-9, 27-28; K. ELZINGA & W. BREIr,
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Such rules did not exist when the treble damages provision was first
enacted in 1890. To give two examples, the Clayton Act of 1914 in-
cluded treble damages, 03 thereby extending the reach of the treble
damage remedy, and summary judgments in antitrust suits traditionally
have been discouraged, 1°4 increasing the "blackmail" effect of filing a
treble damages claim.1" 5
Foreign criticism looks instead to the penal nature of treble dam-
ages,106 and to the dramatic way in which they raise the stakes in anti-
trust suits.1 0 7 These criticisms would apply even if treble damages were
universally considered to be economically efficient. Private individuals
should not be permitted, according to the foreign perspective, to
threaten penal sanctions. This threat becomes even more disturbing
when it is part of a private challenge to a nation's economic ordering.
America's generous approach to assuming jurisdiction, broad dis-
covery practices, widespread use of private remedies, and mandatory
trebling of damages, all serve to make enforcement of American anti-
trust laws very different from enforcement of foreign counterparts. Dis-
agreement over substantive antitrust policy is exacerbated by the anger
aroused by these pro-American, plaintiff-oriented procedures. Recur-
ring international conflicts have prompted various responses by the
United States government.
supra note 99, at 64-66.
los See TREBLE DAMAGES STUDY, supra note 83, at 8.
104 See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); TREBLE
DAMAGES STUDY, supra note 83, at 28.
105 Many marginal cases are pursued because the size of potential treble damage
awards and the costs of defending such suits make a substantial settlement likely. See
Hills, supra note 84, at 18. The reluctance of district courts to dismiss antitrust cases at
an early stage also gives the plaintiff leverage. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 1, 9-11
(testimony of Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor, Department of State). This reluctance
has a significant impact on the length, and therefore the cost, of suits in which the
primary issue is in tort or contract. When antitrust claims were made in such cases, the
median length of the cases increased more than 50% to 15.4 months, a figure close to
the median for other antitrust cases.
106 See Beckett, supra note 35, at 774 (comparing American antitrust law to tor-
ture in light of English law).
107 The effect of the threat of treble damage liability is magnified by the availabil-
ity of class action suits and joint and several liability without contribution among de-
fendants. See TREBLE DAMAGES STUDY, supra note 83, at 28. The effect of these
procedural devices is reflected in the difference in costs incurred by the parties, al-
though some portion of these costs undoubtedly is attributable to the inherently high
nature of the stakes in antitrust cases. The median legal cost per party for civil cases of
all kinds studied in the Georgetown Private Antitrust Litigation Project was $4400 in
1984 dollars, while the average cost for antitrust cases was $75,000. Salop & White,
supra note 55, at 1015.
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III. ATTEMPTS TO DEFUSE THE PROBLEM
Each branch of the federal government has taken action to reduce
the international tension caused by antitrust enforcement. The judicial
and executive branches have been the most active in the area to date.
Congress has been more quiescent, and it is unclear whether the lim-
ited action Congress has taken in the area will soothe any foreign tem-
pers. Neither the judicial nor the executive branches' actions have had
much effect on the problem of private enforcement, however, because
the authority of each, unlike that of Congress, is limited in this area.'" 8
A. The Judicial Branch
The courts have developed several doctrines that either limit their
jurisdiction or provide for the non-exercise of jurisdiction. The only
doctrine likely to have much effect, however-the jurisdictional rule of
reason-has also been the subject of much criticism.
Two limiting doctrines are the act of state doctrine 09 and the for-
108 See ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 264 ("Trade problems must be sorted out by
governments, not lawyers .... Congress, . . . [therefore,] must be factored into the
equation.").
'09 The act of state doctrine ensures that the judiciary does not interfere with the
conduct of foreign affairs by the executive branch, thereby enabling the judiciary to
maintain its impartiality and authority. It prohibits federal courts from adjudicating the
validity of sovereign acts by foreign governments in their own territories. Generally, it
is applied only in cases involving expropriations of property. This doctrine differs from
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in that the act of state doctrine is concerned with
sovereign acts as defenses to otherwise valid claims, not with the sovereign as a party.
The major cases in the area are Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897)
(court refused to sit in judgment regarding the detention of an American citizen by a
Venezuelan government official); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964) (act of state doctrine applies even where the act complained of is alleged to
violate international law); First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Naciona de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759 (1972) (permitting judicial examination of the legal issues raised by the act of a
foreign sovereign within its own territory, because the act of state doctrine would not
advance the interest of United States foreign policy); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (Cuban government failed to meet burden of proof on act of
state question). Underhill described the doctrine as rooted in the respect due other
sovereign countries as equals. See Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252. Sabbatino reformulated
the doctrine as one resting on separation of powers considerations. See Sabbatino, 376
U.S. at 423. A plurality of the Justices wrote in Dunhill that the act of state doctrine
did not apply to acts of foreign governments when they acted in a commercial rather
than sovereign capacity. See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695-706.
The act of state doctrine has barred adjudication of several antitrust cases in which
a foreign government officially expropriated plaintiffs' property. See American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (defendant alleged to have induced Costa
Rica to seize plaintiff's plantation); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.)
(defendants' pressure on plaintiff to bargain hard with Libya alleged to be a factor in
expropriation of plaintiff's concession by Libya), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977);
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal.
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eign government compulsion doctrine,110 which protect those who can
validly raise them as defenses. These doctrines result in dismissal of the
case and thus are used sparingly.
The "effects test" for establishing jurisdiction was first established
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA)."' The re-
quirements of the test were met if the plaintiff could show that the
defendant intended to affect American commerce, and had caused an
actual effect on that commerce.1 12 This test was later reformulated to
require a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on Amer-
ican commerce, and it subsequently was codified in this form.1
If high standards of proof had been applied, or a showing of sub-
stantial effects had actually been demanded in practice, the effects test
1971) (defendants alleged to have induced Gulf State to assert sovereignty over area
claimed by the Gulf State that granted plaintiffs their oil concession), affd, 461 F.2d
1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
Courts generally have refused to apply the act of state doctrine when the foreign
government's involvement was something other than direct expropriation of property,
reasoning that because the foreign government's role was minor, political complications
were not likely to arise from adjudication. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U.S. 268 (1927) (Mexican and Yucatan governments passed legislation favoring
defendants); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979) (foreign patents issued to defendant); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.
594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979) (Indonesian Director of Forestry refused to grant harvest-
ing license to plaintiff), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (embargo im-
-posed on plaintiff by Honduran courts under Honduran law, effectively depriving
plaintiff of his property).
110 The defense of foreign government compulsion applies when a defendant can
show that the anticompetitive act of which the plaintiff complains was compelled by an
order from a foreign government. It is based on considerations of fairness to defendants.
The defendant must show that she was literally compelled to commit the offensive act;
mere encouragement or authorization to act restrictively does not suffice.
When defendants cannot show that they would have been punished under foreign
law for disobeying an order, or that disobeying the order would have led to an end to
the foreign commerce in question, the defense of foreign government compulsion does
not protect them. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690 (1962) (foreign government-bestowed discretion to purchase vanadium
does not shield decision to purchase none from plaintiff); United States v. Watchmakers
of Switz. Info. Center, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1962)
(private agreements that are "recognized as facts of economic and industrial life" in
Switzerland found not compelled by Swiss government), judgment modified, 1965
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del.
1970), in which Venezuela threatened to cut off supplies of oil to two American compa-
nies if they continued to sell to the plaintiff, is the only reported case in which the
foreign government compulsion doctrine has been used to relieve defendants from
liability.
2 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
12 See id. at 431-33.
113 See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, § 402, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6a (1982).
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might have proven to be a means of restricting access to the courts. In
fact, although some cases involving only de minimis effects on American
commerce have been dismissed,114 other courts have applied the test
narrowly enough to render it virtually meaningless in light of the inter-
dependence of American and foreign commerce. In response to the ease
with which the effects test may be met, a new doctrine, the jurisdic-
tional rule of reason, has developed within the last decade.
The jurisdictional rule of reason, set out in Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association,15 is a
balancing test that supplements the effects test. It is generally under-
stood as an abstention doctrine, rooted in comity and due respect for
other sovereigns. In Timberlane, the court suggested seven factors that
the District Court should weigh to determine whether it was appropri-
ate for the court to exercise its jurisdiction. 1 ' This approach was ini-
tially received with hearty approval, and several other circuits have
since adopted versions of it."1
The rule is no longer seen as a panacea, however, because it ap-
pears to suffer from a number of deficiencies. There is no agreed-upon
set of factors in the doctrine, nor has any weight been assigned to the
various factors, thus making the outcome of the test unpredictable.'1 8
Furthermore, there is disagreement as to whether the jurisdictional rule
of reason ought to be considered a prerequisite to jurisdiction or
whether it is a post-jurisdictional question of judicial prudence.1 9 Some
courts have refused to apply it altogether, 20 because it requires courts
114 See, e.g., McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,672
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1984) (harm only to potential customers in Southeast Asia).
115 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
116 For the factors used see infra note 157.
117 The jurisdictional rule of reason has been applied in the following cases:
United States v. Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1106 (1985); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983); Mon-
treal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1001 (1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979).
The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States also has
adopted the jurisdictional rule of reason. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 403.
118 But see Hearings, supra note 2, at 36 (testimony of James S. Campbell and
David Westin) (indicating that there is a developing common law on which factors are
to be taken into account).
119 Compare In re Uranium Antitrust Litig. (Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio
Algom Ltd.), 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) and Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1287
(jurisdictional rule of reason is postjurisdictional) with Montreal Trading, 661 F.2d at
864 and Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1299 (Adams, J., concurring) (jurisdictional
rule of reason is part of jurisdictional test).
120 See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d at 1248.
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to consider political issues inappropriate for the judiciary.121 Other
courts have applied it, with results that are indistinguishable from the
results in cases in which it was not applied.1 2' As a result of the lack of
agreement over how and whether to use the doctrine, and the recent
refusal of some courts of appeals to apply it, the doctrine's future is
uncertain.
Thus, the judicial branch has been unable to find an approach
that reduces antitrust tensions. This is not the result of a failure on the
part of the courts, but instead a result of the nature of the problem.
The problem is one that the judiciary does not have sufficient authority
to resolve.1 23 The judiciary is bound to carry out the congressional
mandate, which in this area has been understood to apply to acts that
take place abroad. The resulting tensions are political in nature. 4
Such matters are neither within judicial competence to resolve, nor are
they appropriate for the judiciary to resolve.1 25 Courts do not have the
knowledge or the constitutional authority to handle political matters,
nor would such knowledge or authority be consistent with the mandate
given the courts by the antitrust laws.
B. The Executive Branch
The executive branch generally has been successful in reducing
international tensions resulting from government antitrust actions. Its
121 See Laker Ariways, 731 F.2d at 948-50.
122 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 749
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985); United States v.
Vetco, Ind., 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Montreal
Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc. 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981); Daishowa Int'l v. North
Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,774 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
Judge Wilkey assessed the effect of the jurisdictional rule of reason and concluded
that "[a] pragmatic assessment of those decisions ... indicates none where U.S. juris-
diction was declined when there was more than a de minimis United States interest."
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 950-951.
122 For example, once a court has found jurisdiction, it is questionable whether it
may abstain when no recognized abstention doctrine exists. See Laker Airways, 731
F.2d at 938; Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1301 n.9 (3d
Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring); see also ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 264 (stating
that "[a]ny solution to assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction cannot be found in the
U.S. judiciary"); Bork, Introduction, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 241, 244 (1982) (suggesting
that the jurisdictional rule of reason "brings a federal court to the verge of its article III
power").
124 In Laker Airways, for example, Judge Wilkey noted, "The conflict faced here
is not caused by the courts of [the United States and Great Britain]. Rather, its sources
are the fundamentally opposed national policies toward prohibition of anticompetitive
business activity." Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 945; see also Bork, supra note 123, at
241 (The jurisdictional rule of reason forces courts to "entangl[e] [themselves] with
political questions which are avoidable in domestic antitrust litigation.").
12 See Laker Airways Ltd., 731 F.2d at 955 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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success stems from various factors, among which are the following:
careful consideration by the Departments of Justice and State of the
international implications of bringing suit;1 26 notification and consulta-
tion with foreign governments over suits thought likely to affect their
interests; 127 refusal to bring cases,128 willingness to drop cases,12 9 or
limitation of the remedies sought when the harm done to foreign rela-
tions outweighs the value of prosecution; 130 and participation in bi- and
multilateral agreements with other countries. 31 The international
agreements are rendered less effective than they might be, however, be-
cause of differences in interpretation by the signatories, 132 and more
seriously, because of the limited effect that the United States has given
to the multilateral agreements to which it is a party. 3
'28 See ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 263; Shenefield, supra note 2, at 350-51.
127 Since 1967, the United States has consulted nearly 500 times with foreign gov-
ernments under OECD guidelines on antitrust. See Shultz, supra note 9, at 305-06.
128 See Meessen, supra note 40, at 795.
129 Id.
130 See United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 875-76 (D.N.J.
1953); Meessen, supra note 40, at 795.
131 The United States has bilateral agreements on antitrust with Australia, Can-
ada, and West Germany. See Agreement . . . Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust
Matters, June 29, 1982, United States-Australia, T.I.A.S. No. 10365; Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America as to Notifi-
cation, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National
Antitrust Laws, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1156, at 560 (March 15,
1984) [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Memorandum];. Agreement . . . Relating to Mutual
Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United States-
West Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291.
Multilateral agreements concerning international antitrust issues that the United
States helped to negotiate and to which the United States is a party include the Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Oct. 7,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1781 (West Supp. 1987)) [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]; New York Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Dec. 29,
1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; Hague Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Mat-
ters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658
U.N.T.S. 163; Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for For-
eign Public Documents, opened for signature Oct. 5, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 10072, 527
U.N.T.S. 189; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Code of Con-
duct for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Doc. 21, (76) 04/1, reprinted in 3 B.
HAWK, supra note 13, at vol. II appendices, at 261; The Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N.
Doc. TD/RBP/Conf/10 (1980), reprinted in, 3 B. HAWK, supra note 13, at vol. II
appendices, at 269 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development);.
132 The United States and Canada disagree, for example, on the crucial question
of whether the U.S.-Canada Memorandum authorizes the compulsory use of process by
one nation's trial court to obtain documents located in the territory of the other. See
U.S., Canada, Agree on Procedures for Cooperation in Antitrust Probes, 46 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1156, at 525 (March 15, 1984).
13- For discussion of the effect American courts have given the Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, see infra text
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The most serious limitation to the success of the executive branch
in reducing international antitrust tensions is that the executive controls
only suits brought by the government. Although the "piggybacking" of
private suits onto successful government suits'" magnifies the effects of
the executive branch's actions, the example set by the Justice Depart-
ment has not been followed by private plaintiffs in antitrust suits in-
volving foreign commerce. Thus, it is necessary for Congress to act to
reformulate the Department's mandate, and to do so broadly enough so
that it may apply to all antitrust actions involving foreign commerce.
C. The Legislative Branch
Until recently, Congress had done very little to stem the tide of
antitrust protests. The purpose of existing legislation had been to im-
prove the lot of American business abroad in specific areas, with little
consideration given to the negative effects of intrusive antitrust enforce-
ment in general.
Congress's first venture in this area was the Webb-Pomerene
Act,"3 ' which exempts from the Sherman Act small associations of com-
panies engaged only in export. The Webb-Pomerene Act, in effect, has
been interpreted out of existence by the judiciary, and therefore has
proven ineffective.1" More recently, Congress enacted the Export
Trading Company Act of 1982,137 the Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act,138 the Pfizer Act, 39 and the National Cooperative Re-
search Act.140 Although these demonstrate increased interest in the an-
titrust problem, they are not likely to help resolve it.
The Export Trading Company Act created a government certifica-
accompanying notes 206-08. German courts, in contrast, treat the Convention as pre-
emptive. See Heck, supra note 30, at 796.
The executive branch also has been unwilling to accord full recognition to multi-
lateral agreements. See Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 495.
" "Piggybacking" refers to the reliance by private plaintiffs upon the doctrine of
res judicata to preclude defendants who have been found to have acted illegally in pre-
vious government antitrust suits from relitigating issues that have been resolved. "Suc-
cessful actions by the Justice Department have traditionally provided the basis for a
large proportion of private treble-damage actions." Note, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust
Injury, and the Per Se Standard, 93 YALE L.J. 1309, 1316 n.37 (1984).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982).
138 There have been no cases since 1968 involving the Webb-Pomerene Act. See
16F J. VON KAL!NOWSKi, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 55.0311]
(1985); see also Note, The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Theory and Appli-
cation, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 525, 546 (1984) (stating that threat of antitrust
challenge chilled small firms from attempting to associate under Webb-Pomerene Act).
137 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982).
138 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
139 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982).
340 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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tion process designed to encourage exports by granting limited exemp-
tions from the antitrust laws. The procedures are cumbersome and ex-
pensive, however, and commentators have expressed considerable doubt
as to whether they will be used."" The Pfizer Act restricts recoveries
by foreign governments to actual damages.1" 2 The National Coopera-
tive Research Act of 1984 loosened antitrust restrictions on cooperative
research projects, and has had some minimal effect. 4
Whereas these laws loosen antitrust restrictions on American busi-
nesses, presumably increasing their competitiveness abroad, they dis-
play a lack of concern for the foreign perception that the United States
imposes its antitrust laws without regard for the interests of its trading
partners.1 44 These laws do not make American antitrust enforcement
more palatable abroad; therefore, they do nothing to end the increasing
resistance toward enforcement.
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 codified
the effects test: there must be an effect on American commerce for ju-
risdiction to exist under the antitrust laws. 45 This act should eliminate
the most egregious abuses of the effects test, but it does not go far
enough.
In 1986, Congress considered several bills that might have gone
far to alleviate the antitrust enforcement conflict. The Reagan adminis-
tration introduced a five-bill package of antitrust reforms, two of which
are relevant here. Senate bill 2162146 drastically narrowed the kinds of
damages that might be trebled, in effect providing a general rule of
actual damages. Senate Bill 2164147 proposed to restrict discovery on
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and to give it priority over other
matters, to mandate use of the jurisdictional rule of reason, and to per-
mit the use of forum non conveniens in antitrust suits involving foreign
commerce. All of the proposed reforms died when the 99th Congress
expired.
141 See, e.g., Shenefield, supra note 2, at 358-59.
142 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982). The United States is also restricted to recovering
actual damages. Id. at § 15a.
141 See Pollack, Uniting to Create Products: Imports Spur Joint Projects, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 14, 1986, at D7, col.1.
144 See Shenefield, supra note 2, at 366.
"I See Note, supra note 136, at 557; see also Shenefield, supra note 2, at 360-64
(tracing development of effects test).
114 S. 2162, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. S. 2284-85 (daily ed. Mar. 7,
1986).
147 S. 2164, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S. 2288 (daily ed. Mar. 7,
1986).
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IV. SOME PROPOSALS
Antitrust practitioners and scholars are well aware of the conflicts
raised by antitrust suits involving foreign commerce. Many remedies
have been suggested-some bizarre,14 8 some chauvinistic,149 and some
sensible. Proposed remedies, however, generally consider only a short-
term American point of view. Their approach is to recognize broadly
that a problem exists and then to seek an answer to the problem within
American borders.
In an area in which no nation can protect its interests effectively
without the cooperation of others, any analysis must instead begin with
the recognition that the United States is merely one among many na-
tions. It is in the long-term interest of the United States to cooperate
with other countries, especially European countries in the antitrust con-
text, even if it thereby sacrifices some short-term interests. Vigorous
American antitrust enforcement is useless, and even detrimental, if
other countries act to negate its effects. Such enforcement does not
achieve the desired increase in competition, it angers our allies and
other nations whose friendships we seek, and it is contrary to the devel-
opment of a stable international community. Given the results of vigor-
ous antitrust enforcement, it is in the United States's overall interest to
bend somewhat to foreign desires. This Comment makes several pro-
posals that consider the broader international perspective.
First, where the "effects test" is used to determine jurisdiction, the
plaintiff should meet a higher standard of proof of actual effects on
trade or commerce with foreign nations. Second, the doctrine of forum
non conveniens should apply to antitrust suits involving foreign com-
merce. Third, the procedures established by the Hague Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters should
be used as a matter of course for discovery in signatory countries.
Fourth, discovery abroad should be limited, with certain qualifications,
to information that is not available in the United States, and that would
be admissible at trial. Finally, plaintiffs, in most cases, should recover
only actual damages when the defendant has been compelled or actively
148 One proposal contemplates an amendment to § 4 of the Clayton Act that
would require the courts to apply an "intended effects" test limited only by narrowly
construed sovereignty-related defenses, and the President to make the determination
whether the courts should have jurisdiction based on the foreign policy interests of the
United States. The purpose of this interim proposal is deliberately to generate friction
to increase the pressure on national governments to reach a multilateral solution. See
Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 11, at 885, 922-28.
'4' See Note, The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to International Cartels
Involving Foreign Governments, 91 YALE L.J. 765 (1983) (recommending that Ameri-
can antitrust laws be applied to anticompetitive acts by foreign governments).
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encouraged by a foreign government to do the acts in question.
These suggestions do not provide definitive answers to the
problems caused by enforcement of the antitrust laws; rather, they are
possibilities that may deserve consideration. A brief discussion of each
follows. The jurisdictional rule of reason is also discussed because it is
widely viewed as an appropriate method of lessening the tensions of
antitrust enforcement in the international arena. That assessment of the
jurisdictional rule of reason is disputed herein.
Suggestion 1: Jurisdiction: Requiring Proof of Actual Effects
Where subject matter jurisdiction is based primarily on ef-
fects on American commerce, the burden of persuasion shall
be on the plaintiff to prove actual effects on trade or com-
merce with foreign nations.
The current standard for showing effects at the jurisdictional
stage-"a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" 150-has
proven unsatisfactory. As stated earlier, it has led to foreign protests
over its breadth as applied. United States courts have also come to feel
that the standard as applied gives insufficient weight to the interests of
other countries when foreign parties are involved.151 In response they
have developed the limiting doctrine known as the jurisdictional rule of
reason, first set out in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America
National Trust & Savings Association. 52 The rule requires a court to
balance a set of factors based on comity concerns in order to ascertain
whether the court should take jurisdiction. Courts and commentators
initially endorsed this approach,"5" but more recently severe doubts
have been expressed as to its manageability and appropriateness. This
Comment argues that the jurisdictional rule of reason is neither appro-
priate nor manageable, and that the need to limit the effects test is
better fulfilled by raising the standard of proof courts apply to the ef-
fects test.
150 15 U.S.C § 6(a)(1) (1982).
151 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n. 549
F.2d 597, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1976).
152 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
153 See, e.g., Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-70 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); RESTATEMENT, supra note 42,
§ 403(2).
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The Jurisdictional Rule of Reason Is Not an Appropriate Means of
Resolving Conflicts over Antitrust Suits in Foreign Commerce
The jurisdictional rule of reason is an unreasonable rule. It does
not serve its intended purpose for two reasons: it is not in accordance
with international law, and it is inherently unworkable.
The two primary bases of jurisdiction in international law are ter-
ritoriality and nationality. Effects jurisdiction in the antitrust context is
an extension of an offshoot of the territoriality principle known as the
objective territoriality principle. The rejection by the international com-
munity of effects jurisdiction, at least as applied by American courts,
already has been explored.'" Even if effects jurisdiction were a rule of
international law, however, the jurisdictional rule of reason would not
be in accordance with international law.
Once a basis for jurisdiction exists, international law does not at-
tempt to restrict the exercise of that jurisdiction. The balancing of in-
terests required by the jurisdictional rule of reason is a principle of
domestic conflicts of law,"55 not of public international law. Nations do,
of course, take comity concerns into account when deciding whether to
exercise jurisdiction, but this assessment is one of policy rather than
law. 5 Furthermore, it is generally carried out by the executive in an
allocation of decisionmaking that follows from the usual application of
the objective territorial principle to acts generally recognized as crimes.
Thus, it is not a satisfactory response to a foreign protest over the
exercise of effects jurisdiction that it is permitted by the jurisdictional
rule of reason; the jurisdictional rule of reason is not a rule of interna-
tional law. Moreover, the balancing of interests by courts is offensive to
foreign nations, as the decision cannot be made without inquiry into the
genuineness of asserted foreign interests. Thus, any exercise of jurisdic-
tion clearly is premised upon a finding that American interests out-
weigh those of the protesting nation. Finally, the degree of indepen-
dence enjoyed by American courts means that foreign nations have little
influence upon the decision and are left with little recourse once the
decision is made.
' See supra notes 39-42, 51-53 and accompanying text.
'" See, e.g., Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interests Analysis, 32 AM.
J. CoMp. L. 1 (1984) (discussing two models of conflict analysis: a rule-bound ap-
proach and a balancing of interests approach).
156 A balancing of national interests approach is one of the aspects of comity.
Although it is important as a source of harmony in international relations, comity is not
a rule of international law. See Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRrr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 215-16 (1972-73); Kadish, Comity and the International Applica-
tion of the Sherman Act: Encouraging the Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130, 143 (1982); Maier, supra note 26, at 281.
1032 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
In addition to being unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of interna-
tional law, the jurisdictional rule of reason is not manageable. As yet,
there has been no agreement as to the definitive set of factors to be
considered under the rule. Approximately fifteen different factors can
be found in the cases that apply, or refuse to apply, the rule.157 The
factors fall into three broad categories: factors already considered when
the court found subject-matter and in personam jurisdiction ("jurisdic-
tional factors"),158 factors that serve to tell the court that there is a
17 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n., 549
F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) applied seven factors:
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
(2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or princi-
pal places of business of the corporations;
(3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance;
(4) the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared
with those elsewhere;
(5) the extent to which there is an explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce;
(6) the foreseeability of such an effect;
(7) the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614.
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), used
four of the factors above, and added:
(8) the availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation
there;
(9) the possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdic-
tion and grants relief;
(10) the possibility that granting relief will force a party to choose be-
tween obeying American law and obeying foreign law;
(11) the acceptability in the United States of a similar order for relief by a
foreign nation;
(12) the existence of a relevant treaty with the affected nation.
Id. at 1297-98.
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States has still a differ-
ent set of factors, including:
(13) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regula-
tion to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted;
(14) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation in question;
(15) the importance of the regulation in question to the international polit-
ical, legal or economic system;
(16) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, §403. Although these factors overlap to some ex-
tent, basically, the set of factors is elastic.
258 See factors 2, 4-7 listed supra note 157.
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conflict ("conflict factors"), 1 59 and factors that require the court to
make a political judgment ("political factors")."' 0 These factors, how-
ever, do not guide a court to a decision as to whether or not the exercise
of jurisdiction is "reasonable."
The jurisdictional factors are both biased and misleading. They
are biased because the court has already decided that they weigh in
favor of hearing the case. For example, the extent to which the acts
alleged substantially harmed American competition, or were intended
to do so are factors considered when the court decides whether there is
a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on American
commerce. These factors encourage the court to treat the jurisdictional
rule of reason as a question of sufficient contact with the United States,
using the rule as a jurisdictional "hook," instead of as a balancing of
United States and foreign interests. Not surprisingly, any doubts as to
the propriety of exercising jurisdiction tend to be resolved in favor of
exercising it.161
The jurisdictional factors are also misleading. The Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, considered by many courts
to be an authoritative statement of international law, implies that the
jurisdictional rule of reason is part of an internationally-minded rule of
"reason." '62 Courts, therefore, are deceived into believing that their de-
cisions do not violate international law.
The conflict factors are pointless. Considering them does place the
case in question in international perspective, but these factors give no
guidance as to how the court should resolve the conflict it finds. Dis-
missal of an action should not rest solely on the degree of conflict it
generates, because that, in effect, would allow other countries to dictate
when American antitrust law should be enforced. The exercise of juris-
diction in American courts, then, would stand or fall based on political
decisions made abroad. This is carrying comity too far.
Finally, a number of factors suggested by the Restatement require
political judgments.163 Political factors are not within judicial compe-
tence to resolve or judicial authority to decide.'" Whether expectations
1"I See factors 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16 listed supra note 157.
110 See factors 9, 11, 14, 15 listed supra note 157.
101 Maier explains the "homing tendency" of courts using the jurisdictional rule
of reason by emphasizing the complexity of the decision, the natural tendency of judges
to sympathize with national values, and the difficulty of ascertaining the true weight of
the foreign interests involved. See Maier, supra note 26, at 317. A similar explanation
is offered by Judge Wilkey. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Air-
lines, 731 F.2d 909, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
102 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 423 comment a.
163 See factors 13-15 listed supra note 157.
16 Maier points out that "there is some anomaly in a court's finding that a regu-
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are reasonable, for example, depends on whether the underlying regu-
lation is considered a desirable and necessary national policy. For an
American court to judge whether a foreign company reasonably should
have expected to be subject to American antitrust laws is to assume that
those laws are a legitimate exercise of authority by the American gov-
ernment. Yet this is the heart of the conflict between the United States
and its trading partners.
Although the motive behind the jurisdictional rule of reason is
laudable, the rule itself, as it has developed, does not serve the intended
purpose. It potentially deceives courts into thinking that they are ap-
propriately accommodating foreign interests, when, in reality, the ap-
proach they are using is not recognized abroad as legitimate. The rule
also serves to give foreign countries a direct influence over the enforce-
ment of American antitrust laws and to embroil the courts in issues
that are beyond the scope of their authority. Because no weight has
been assigned to the various factors, the results achieved by application
of the jurisdictional rule of reason are unpredictable, except to the ex-
tent that one may predict that the rule will continue to serve as a fur-
ther justification for exercising jurisdiction. In short, the jurisdictional
rule of reason does not, in fact, promote a rule of reason.
Requiring Plaintiffs to Prove Actual Effects at the Jurisdictional
Stage Is Both Appropriate and Manageable
The current "direct, substantial and foreseeable" standard for ef-
fects is a reformulation of the case law that has developed since the
leading case of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (AL-
COA).16 5 In that case, the Second Circuit, speaking as the court of last
resort, laid down an "intent and effects" standard.166 It immediately
undercut the effects prong by shifting the burden of proof on that ques-
tion to the defendant once intent had been shown. 167 Later courts have
undercut both prongs by requiring only general intent" 8 and by apply-
lation may be applied without violating international jurisdictional standards but that
the Congressional command will not be followed if the court determines that as a mat-
ter of policy the regulation is inappropriately applied." Maier, supra note 26, at 299.
165 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
16 See id. at 444.
167 See id.
16 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 494 F. Supp. 1161,
1184 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (interpreting the ALCOA case as requiring only general intent);
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 227 (S.D.N.Y 1975)
(finding that intent requirement is satisfied by a general intent to affect commerce); see
also ANTITRUST DIVISION, UNTIED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIcE, ANTITRUST
GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6 (1977) (stating that intent is inferable
when there is a "substantial and foreseeable" effect on United States commerce).
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ing a relaxed standard to proof of effects."69
Until recently, then, the effects standard did not in fact require
plaintiffs to show that the conduct complained of was "intended to af-
fect [United States foreign commerce] and did affect [it]."117 0 Reluctance
by courts to insist on proof of a specific intent to violate the antitrust
laws is understandable and reasonable; such an intent will be difficult
to show when defendants are sufficiently sophisticated to avoid leaving
a paper trail, and when the conduct in question substantially harms
United States foreign commerce it is reasonable to infer that the harm
was intended. The decline of the effects prong is not as justifiable.
The low effects standard applied by courts in practice has meant
that United States courts have taken jurisdiction in cases in which for-
eign nations had a clear interest while the United States interest was
rather more remote.171 Such cases have bred charges of economic impe-
rialism: the United States has been perceived as attempting to impose
its economic priorities on the rest of the world.1 72 Although United
States antitrust cases involving foreign commerce have made the world
economy more competitive, 17 moderation in all things is a virtue.
When, for example, a foreign court nullifies plaintiff's joint venture
agreement to harvest lumber within the country and the foreign govern-
ment in question cancels its approval for the agreement,1 74 some defer-
ence is due, even if the nullification and cancellation are the result of
defendant's actions. The country in question evidently agrees with the
defendant that such actions are in its economic interest. To hear the
case when the plantiff merely claimed that it intended to import the
169 See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp.
92 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (finding that substantial anticompetitive effect is not necessary,
some effect is sufficient), affd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972); 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 20 § 6.14 ("ALCOA precedents
[arguably] . . . .permit[] an assertion of jurisdiction ...even if no identifiable eco-
nomic impact can be shown."); 1 B. HAWK, supra note 13, at 115 ("Courts tended to
give considerable deference to plaintiff's allegations regarding effect. Frequently juris-
diction was upheld where a more than de minimis effect was alleged.").
170 ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 444.
171 See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 890 (5th
Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983); cf Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (case in
United States' courts for more than 10 years before Ninth Circuit found there was no
jurisdiction).
172 See Minding Other People's Business, ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 1977, at 78 ("It
is not acceptable that one country should unilaterally purport to set the rules for world
business."), quoted in 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 20, § 4.11.
173 See Rahl, supra note 16, at 353 (noting that enforcement of United States's
antitrust laws had a direct bearing on the demise of post-World War II global cartels).
174 See Mitsui, 671 F.2d at 885.
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lumber into the United States, but had not done so,"7 5 violates the re-
spect due other nations.
The low standard of proof of effects has also led to the taking of
jurisdiction in cases where such jurisdiction is arguably not warranted
by international law. After decades of protest, some version of the ef-
fects doctrine is increasingly being recognized abroad, but the scope of
the effects test used by other nations is not as broad as that applied by
American courts.176 Because protests are still being received over the
breadth of United States jurisdiction, it is difficult to say that this scope
is legal under international law, as customary international law is
founded upon the consent of nations. Furthermore, while more vigorous
enforcement of foreign antitrust laws benefits the United States, the
potential for chaos also increases as other nations join the United States
in the pursuit of pure competition. It would be wise for the United
States to limit the application of its effects test to set an example of
restraint. Because the premise for this limitation is that other nations
have become serious players in the antitrust arena, the promotion of
competition will not be limited overall.
Finally, and most compellingly, in cases where jurisdiction is
based primarily on effects, and not on traditional territoriality or na-
tionality, plaintiffs should be required to prove that such effects are
more than plausible allegations. Otherwise jurisdiction is based merely
on claims of the plaintiff, normally an insufficient basis to sustain
jurisdiction. 77
Such a heightened standard has been used in a number of recent
cases and has led to dismissal at the jurisdictional stage for failure to
show substantial effects.17 8 Thus, it is feasible for courts to apply a
175 Id. at 886.
276 See cases cited supra notes 29-30.
177 Rahl has also argued along these lines. See Rahl, International Application of
the American Antitrust Laws: Issues & Proposals, 2 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 336,
342 (1980) (suggesting statutory change requiring proof of both intent and substantial
effect on price and other factors when the activity occurs abroad); cf. Akehurst, Juris-
diction in International Law, 46 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 154-55 (1972-73) (arguing
that jurisdiction under international law should exist only in states in which the "pri-
mary effects" of an act have been felt).
18 See, e.g., Papst Motoren GMbH v. Kanematsu-Goshu (USA) Inc., 629 F.
Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissed on motion for summary judgment because effect
on resale market in United States insufficient when plaintiff sold product exclusively in
foreign market); Power East, Ltd. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 558 F. Supp. 47
(S.D.N.Y.) (dismissed on the pleadings because effects solely in Saudi Arabia), affd,
742 F.2d 1439 (2d Cir. 1983); Conservation Council of Western Austl. v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 518 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (dismissed on the pleadings be-
cause sole effects alleged were on "regional resources and environmental systems of
Western Australia"). The Second Circuit has developed a variant of this standard. See
National Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981) (dismissing
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heightened standard without becoming enmeshed in a pre-trial mini-
trial on jurisdictional issues. A heightened effects standard also has the
virtue that it involves merely a raising of the burden of proof on an
issue familiar to courts, rather than the consideration of numerous and
unfamiliar factors as required by the jurisdictional rule of reason. Fi-
nally, it is the standard envisioned by ALCOA:
179
Almost any limitation on the supply of goods in Europe...
or in South America, may have repercussions in the United
States if there is trade between the two. Yet when one con-
siders the international complications likely to arise from an
effort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it
is safe to assume that Congress certainly did not intend the
Act to cover them.180
Suggestion 2: Forum Non Conveniens: Applying Forum Non
Conveniens to Antitrust Cases Involving Foreign Commerce
The doctrine of forum non conveniens shall apply to anti-
trust suits involving foreign commerce.
Forum non conveniens is a postjurisdictional discretionary doctrine
that permits courts to dismiss suits that are more conveniently litigated
elsewhere.181 In its most recent major decision on the doctrine, Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 8 2 the United States Supreme Court held that a
showing that the substantive law of the alternative forum is less
favorable to plaintiffs is not, in itself, a reason to refuse to dismiss a
case on forum non conveniens grounds."8 ' Less stringent antitrust laws
abroad, then, should not necessarily be a barrier to the use of forum
non conveniens in antitrust suits involving foreign commerce.
Forum non conveniens has not been applied to antitrust cases in-
for failure to show that termination of bank as credit card bank would have an an-
ticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce); Bulk Oil (ZUG) A.G., Co. v. Sun Co., 583 F.
Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
835 (1984).
179 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
180 Id. at 443.
I' Factors that the Court takes into account include: the private interest of the
litigants, the relative ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, court congestion, the burden of jury duty,
local interest in deciding local controversies, and the appropriateness of the court apply-
ing its own law, instead of another's. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-
09 (1947).
'12 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
183 Id. at 247.
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volving foreign commerce, however, because the Supreme Court held in
United States v. National City Lines, Inc. ("National City Lines I") 8
that forum non conveniens was not applicable in such cases. Although
National City Lines I was severely narrowed in United States v. Na-
tional City Lines, Inc. ("National City Lines IT),85 the rule laid
down by National City Lines I has survived. 8 ' Moreover, one circuit
court recently held that forum non conveniens is not applicable to anti-
trust suits involving foreign commerce even if National City Lines I is
not controlling. It reasoned that no other country would enforce Ameri-
can antitrust laws, and therefore dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds would effectively place a defendant's conduct beyond the reach
of the Sherman Act.
1 8 7
This concern for the enforcement of United States antitrust laws is
not wholly warranted. Where the alternative forum available to the
plaintiff is a foreign one, it is not necessary that United States law be
enforced in that forum. It is only necessary that the defendant be ame-
nable to process in a forum that permits litigation of the subject matter
of the dispute."88 Thus, it is sufficient if the plaintiff can bring suit
against the defendant under a foreign antitrust law.
Enforcement of United States antitrust laws may be compromised
to some extent where necessary to strengthen the international legal
system. The Supreme Court recognized this in its recent decision in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.""9 In that
case, Mitsubishi Motors, a Japanese auto manufacturer, sued Soler, a
Puerto Rican corporation, to compel arbitration of a breach of contract
claim. Soler countersued, alleging antitrust violations by Mitsubishi
184 334 U.S. 573 (1948).
185 337 U.S. 78 (1949). National City Lines I held that forum non conveniens was
inapplicable to antitrust suits on the ground that § 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 22 (1982), was intended to broaden plaintiff's choice of venue and could not have
been intended to permit courts to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds when they
had never done so previously. See National City Lines I, 334 U.S. at 580-82. National
City Lines 11 held that the recently enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which provides that
"a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought," authorized the use of forum non conveniens, and thus effec-
tively reversed National City Lines I as to domestic suits. Because § 1404(a) applies to
transfers between federal district courts, it did not affect the holding of National City
Lines I as to suits that might otherwise have been dismissed to a foreign forum.
186 See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 890-91 (5th
Cir. 1982) (holding that forum non conveniens is not applicable to antitrust suits in
foreign commerce regardless of whether National City Lines I is controlling), vacated
and remanded, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983).
187 See id. at 890-91.
188 See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22; Phoenix Can. Oil Co. v. Texaco, 78
F.R.D. 445 (D. Del. 1978).
189 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
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Motors, and arguing that the arbitration clause in the contract did not
apply to that claim. The Court enforced the arbitration clause, reason-
ing that "concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of
disputes" 190 outweighed the considerations favoring adjudication of the
antitrust claim in an American court. Particularly noteworthy in this
context is that the Court allowed the antitrust claim to be decided in an
arbitration tribunal rather than in a court.
Although the Court claimed that arbitration of a United States
antitrust claim by Japanese arbitrators would not undermine enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws,191 this is not a credible assertion. While the
Japanese do have antitrust laws, they are not vigorously enforced; 92
Japanese lawyers, therefore, are not likely to be familiar with antitrust
claims or have sympathy for their enforcement-no matter how objec-
tive and experienced they may be.
There is a significant difference between permitting foreign judi-
dal resolution of United States antitrust claims, a result that would be
reached by use of forum non conveniens, and foreign arbitral resolu-
tion of those claims, which Mitsubishi permits. Arbitration is oriented
toward settling claims, not deciding parties' rights. Arbitration's em-
phasis on the cooperation of the parties and the maintenance of a busi-
ness relationship serves the triple purposes of American antitrust
laws-punishment of wrongdoers, compensation of victims, and deter-
rence of wrongdoing-far less well then judicial resolution, even where
the forum is less sympathetic to plaintiffs. The Supreme Court's will-
ingness to allow American antitrust claims to be decided by a Japanese
arbitration panel is a recognition, therefore, that the enforcement of
American antitrust laws may, in some cases, be appropriately subordi-
nated to the promotion of international harmony.
Forum non conveniens is, moreover, a desirable doctrine for the
courts to use in accommodating the United States' interest in antitrust
enforcement to the international system. It is apolitical; it involves fac-
190 Id. at 3355.
191 Id. at 3358-60.
"' From April 1983 to March 1984 the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, the
primary body responsible for enforcing Japanese antitrust laws, investigated 328 cases.
The investigations resulted in 11 recommendations, 118 warnings, and 105 closings of
cases. See Japan's FTC Responds to World Economic Changes by Promoting Free
Competition, 48 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1196, at 40 (Jan. 3, 1985);
see also Ramseyer, supra note 78 at 627-34 (barriers to litigation have eliminated vir-
tually all deterrents to cartelization in Japan. In 37 years as the principal enforcement
agency of the Antimonopoly Act, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission has brought
only 6 criminal prosecutions. Id. at 616.
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tors the courts are well-equipped to evaluate; 93 and it explicitly recog-
nizes that the United States is not the only country interested in pro-
moting competition and defers to foreign countries in circumstances
likely to evoke resentment if United States courts were to exercise
jurisdiction.
194
There is potentially one major flaw in the use of forum non con-
veniens in antitrust cases involving foreign commerce. Until recently,
the United States was the only country to provide a forum in which
private plaintiffs could bring antitrust claims. 95 Because Piper re-
quires, at a minimum, that an adequate alternative forum be available
to the plaintiff,"98 the lack of private remedies abroad would render the
forum non conveniens provision pointless.
It is, however, no longer the case that the United States provides
the only effective remedy to private plaintiffs. In 1976, Canada enacted
an amendment to the Combines Investigation Act, the Canadian anti-
trust law, which permits private suits to remedy some violations.197 The
EEC has persuaded member countries to permit private suits to enforce
Articles 85 and 86 (the antitrust articles) of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community.9 " Thus, although the private cause of action
still is only a pale reflection of that available in the United States,"9
one can predict a future increase in private enforcement abroad. Euro-
pean and Canadian courts, therefore, may become adequate forums in
the near future.
A further consideration is the interaction between forum non con-
veniens and foreign blocking laws. Because one of the factors consid-
ered in determining forum non conveniens is access to sources of
proof, 00 a foreign country may use its blocking law to encourage a
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. The availability of docu-
ments is merely one aspect of forum non conveniens, however, and the
courts may employ sanctions to render such tactics useless to the de-
fendant. Moreover, to the extent that important documents are located
191 See Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L.J. 1693, 1708-09 (1985).
' See id. at 1710-11.
193 See supra note 42.
See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
197 Combines Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 23 (1970), amended by ch.
76, 1974-1976 CAN. STAT. 1535.
199 See ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 257, 258.
199 See id. at 258 ("So far . . . there has been not a single damage judgment
entered in a national court of a[n] [EEC] member state based on conduct offensive to
EC competition regulations; in German and UK courts, there have been interloctuory
[sic] rulings and enunciated principles that support private competition law
enforcement.").
200 See Piper, 454 U.S. at 258-59.
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abroad, it may be appropriate to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds, thus avoiding the conflict caused by requiring such documents.
Finally, the reformed approach to antitrust enforcement advocated by
this Comment should encourage other countries to moderate the hostil-
ity with which American requests for documents are met. Thus, forum
non conveniens is potentially a major step forward in reducing the con-
flicts generated by applying American antitrust laws to foreign
commerce.
Suggestion 3: Hague Evidence Convention: Mandatory but not
Exclusive
The procedures established by the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters
are to be used for all discovery in signatory countries unless
it would clearly be pointless to do so. These procedures are
not exclusive.
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters0 1 ("the Convention") is a treaty to which
the United States and sixteen other countries are signatories. 2  It es-
tablishes three procedures for obtaining discovery abroad. The first
procedure involves a "letter of request" from the trial court to a foreign
authority, requesting a foreign court to carry out the discovery in ques-
tion.203 The second procedure involves having a diplomatic or consular
official in the requesting country carry out the discovery. 20' The third
procedure involves the trial court's appointment of a commissioner to
take the evidence abroad, with the permission of foreign authorities.205
The Convention has not been given the same effect in all of the
signatory countries.20 ' Two ambiguities exist: whether the Convention
'0' Hague Evidence Convention, Oct. 7, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444,
847 U.N.T.S. 231 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1987)).
202 The other signatories to the Hague Evidence Convention are: Barbados, Cy-
prus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. See id.; Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Pro-
cedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (1984).
203 See Hague Evidence Convention, Oct. 7, 1972, arts. 1-14, 23 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp.
1987)).
20 See id. at arts. 15, 16, 18-22.
205 See id. at arts. 17-22.
100 The Hague Evidence Convention is preemptive under German law, for exam-
ple. See Heck, supra note 30, at 796.
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is mandatory and whether it is exclusive. With regard to the first point,
the Convention is a treaty that has been ratified by the President and
the Senate. Although it would be reasonable to conclude that the Con-
vention therefore is mandatory, the federal courts have qualified the
obligations imposed by the Convention.
Two recent cases have distinguished between parties subject to the
trial court's jurisdiction and those that are not, and between parties
supplying information voluntarily and involuntarily. In Work v.
Bier,207 the District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
Convention was not binding with respect to orders to parties subject to
the court's jurisdiction. In In re Anschuetz & Co.,208 the Fifth Circuit
held that parties may waive the use of Convention procedures. The
application of the Convention, therefore, is restricted to gathering infor-
mation located abroad from parties not subject to the court's jurisdiction
or from unwilling witnesses.2 °9
These decisions have undermined the purpose of the Convention.
The Convention is an agreement among nations, not parties. The sig-
natories entered into this agreement not merely to ensure that discovery
requests are complied with, but also to eliminate the difficulties arising
from differing approaches to discovery. Allowing a French party, for
example, to waive application of the Convention to information located
in France is a serious mistake. France, like other civil law countries,
regards the gathering of information as a question of judicial sover-
eignty;21 0 it surely would resent attempts to circumvent its authority.
The fact that the party is subject to an American court's jurisdiction is
not likely to be considered a mitigating factor. Carrying out the Con-
vention's purpose is impossible unless American courts routinely use
the Convention procedures.
On the other hand, the Convention procedures alone are not suffi-
cient. They are limited to civil cases, and more importantly, the Con-
vention significantly restricts the procedures available. The second and
third procedures, which do not involve the participation of foreign judi-
207 106 F.R.D. 45, 55-56 (D.D.C. 1985).
208 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985).
209 The limited utility that results from this interpretation is evident when one
considers how other countries apply the Convention. In Britain, for example, there
generally is no power to compel nonparties to produce documents. Article 10 of the
Convention explicitly provides that compulsion is to apply "to the same extent as...
provided by . . . internal law." Hague Evidence Convention, Oct. 7, 1972, art. 10, 23
U.S.T. 2555. T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781
(West Supp. 1987). If United States courts interpreted the Convention as applicable
only to nonparties, they would for all intents and purposes nullify its effectiveness.
210 See Carter, Obtaining Foreign Discovery and Evidence for Use in the United
States: Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L LAW. 5, 7 (1979).
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cial authorities, in effect are optional in that they apply only to con-
senting witnesses, unless the foreign government is willing to compel
evidence.211
The letter of request procedure is binding, but sizeable loopholes
exist. One potentially controversial loophole is that signatory countries
may refuse to execute a letter of request "issued for the purpose of
obtaining pretrial discovery of documents."2 2 This could be understood
to exclude virtually all requests for documents from American courts,
as a German court apparently has construed it.21 There is some evi-
dence that other countries intend to use the provision only to prevent
the execution of letters of request that do not specify the documents
sought.21 4 Nevertheless, the pretrial documents provision and another
set of provisions, which provide that a letter of request need not be
... The Hague Evidence Convention assumes that witnesses testify voluntarily. A
signatory may choose to permit compulsion of its nationals. See Hague Evidence Con-
vention, Oct. 7, 1972, arts. 10, 18, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S.
231 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1987)).
212 See id. art. 23. With the exception of the United States, Czechoslovakia, and
Israel, all signatories have reserved the right to refuse to execute such letters of request.
See Radvan, The Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters: Several Notes Concerning its Scope, Methods and Compulsion, 16
N.Y.U. J. INTr'L L. & POL. 1031, 1042 (1984).
"I See Decision with Regard to a United States Court Request for Judicial Assis-
tance and the Taking of Evidence, 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1025, 1054-56 (1981)
(reporting Coming Glass Works v. ITT, W. Ger. Ct. App. 1980). For a discussion of
this case and an analysis of the ambiguities of the phrase "pre-trial discovery," see
Radvan, supra note 212, at 1043-45.
114 In 1976, the United Kingdom deposited its instrument of ratification with the
following reservation:
In accordance with Article 23 Her Majesty's Government declare that the
United Kingdom will not execute Letters of Request issued for the pur-
pose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents. Her Majesty's Govern-
ment further declare that Her Majesty's Government understand "Letters
of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of docu-
ments" for the purposes of the foregoing Declaration as including any
Letter of Request which requires a person:
a. to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the
Letter of Request relates are, or have been, in his possession, custody, or
power; or
b. to produce any documents other than particular documents speci-
fied in the Letter of Request as being documents appearing to the request-
ing court to be, or to be likely to be, in his possession, custody or power.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1987). Although this declaration is phrased as "in-
cluding" non-specific Letters of Request, it has been understood to apply only to such
Letters. See Report on the Work of the Special Committee on the Operation of the
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, June 12-15, 1978, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1417
(1978). Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Sweden subsequently have
made similar reservations or modified previously absolute reservations.
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executed if it is impossible to perform it using local procedures, 215 if it
prejudices sovereignty or security," 6 or if it violates a local privilege or
duty not to give evidence,2 17 mean that the Convention procedures will
not be completely satisfactory.
Using the Convention procedures as a first resort and resorting to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if necessary is the best way
to balance the search for international harmony and the enforcement of
the antitrust laws.
218
Suggestion 4: Restrict the Scope of Discovery
1) In antitrust suits involving foreign trade or commerce,
parties may seek discovery abroad only to the extent that:
a) the information sought does not duplicate informa-
tion available in the United States, and
b) the information sought is likely to be admissable at
trial, if supplied, if and only if the presence of the doc-
uments abroad is the result of a good faith business
practice.
2) The court may not grant such a request for discovery un-
less it concludes that the discovery methods to be used do not,
on their faces, violate the laws of the country in which the
information will be gathered.
215 See Hague Evidence Convention, Oct. 7, 1972, art. 9, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S.
No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1987)).
211 See id. art. 12(b). This provision formed the basis of Great Britain's refusal to
execute letters rogatory in the uranium disputes. See Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., [19781 1 App. Cas. 547, 561.
217 See Hague Evidence Convention, Oct. 7, 1972, art. 11, 23 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp.
1987)).
218 This approach, in essence, has been used in several cases: Laker Airways Ltd.
v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom. Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Phil-
adelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60-61 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 15, 1983); Pierburg GmbH & Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238,
247-48, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 882-83 (1982); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Su-
perior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 858, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 884-85 (1981). The
primacy of the Hague Evidence Convention is treated as a matter of comity, however,
rather than as a matter of binding law.
The effect of the Convention is presently under consideration before the Supreme
Court in In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. granted sub nom. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United
States Dist. Court, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986).
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Two notable features of American discovery are its wide-ranging
nature and the relatively limited role of judges in the process. This
suggestion modifies these features in antitrust suits that involve foreign
commerce so they more closely resemble the European model of discov-
ery. If adopted, the effect would be to reduce the likelihood of under-
mining the role of foreign authorities, and as a consequence, to en-
courage foreign governments to cooperate with, or at the least not to
hinder, parties' searches for information.
Restricting permissible discovery to non-duplicative material does
not harm the party seeking discovery and it benefits the party from
whom information is requested by reducing the potential for abuse of
discovery."' 9 This form of abuse generally is recognized as one of the
faults of current antitrust procedure.220 Although counterarguments
favoring broad discovery are particularly relevant to antitrust suits, in
which the matters to be proved are complex and often highly techni-
cal,22 they are less convincing in suits involving foreign commerce,
where the alternative to limited discovery abroad often means no dis-
covery abroad.222
Foreign governments have reacted strongly against the enforce-
ment of United States discovery orders that require the production of
documents located abroad.223 If the use of blocking laws is to be dis-
21 Discovery requests often are used to burden the opposing party rather than to
seek information. See supra note 55.
220 See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 55, at 42; see also Kurland,
supra note 55, at 4 (describing discovery in antitrust suits as "a mere test of endurance
whose outcome depends not so much on the merits of each side's legal position as on the
relative depths of each side's pockets").
221 But cf. Kurland, supra note 55, at 4:
[W]ith the exception of [a] few monopoly and market structure cases, the
gut issues involved in most antitrust cases are not inherently that compli-
cated.. . . [T]he core issue usually concerns the fact of violation itself, an
issue that almost always revolves around the testimony of a handful of
people and that can usually be sufficiently discovered in a fairly short
period of time.
222 See Flexner, Foreign Discovery and U.S. Antitrust Policy-The Conflict
Resolving Mechanisms, Remarks Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Nov.
15, 1978), reprinted in 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 315, 318 (1979) (Justice Depart-
ment representative stating that compulsory process for obtaining documents abroad is
of "limited utility. . . . It occasionally produced some interesting subpoena enforce-
ment litigation, but not many documents."); see also 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER,
supra note 20, § 15.02 (discussing Justice Department's use of voluntary disclosure
approach).
222 Rosenthal states, "[E]very national blocking law in effect today . . . was ex-
plicitly adopted as a measure of self-protection against the unilateral extraterritorial
application of United States law. In each case, the legislating state viewed some United
States laws, especially . . . discovery laws, as a direct infringement of its sovereignty."
Rosenthal, supra note 21, at 491-92 (footnote omitted). For a partial list of existing
blocking laws, see supra note 22.
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couraged, the United States cannot continue to impose its standards of
discovery on the world. Although it is a radical provision, restricting
the evidence sought to that likely to be admissible at trial is a proposi-
tion worth considering.224 This provision attempts to ensure that dis-
covery requests are limited to those permissible under foreign laws,
which, after all, have been used effectively to prosecute antitrust cases
abroad.225 Even so, it is not unlikely that this provision would be more
generously interpreted by American courts than European courts, given
the American penchant for broad discovery.
Recent domestic dissatisfaction with the current scope of discov-
ery22 has led to a proposal to limit discovery to relevant issues, rather
than to the subject-matter involved in the action.227 Current antitrust
litigation, however, already focuses on relevant issues. The court pro-
gressively narrows the scope of permissible discovery to relevant issues
because the potentially relevant documents often are too numerous to
handle. Therefore, while the relevant issues proposal, if adopted, would
affect antitrust suits by changing the background against which discov-
ery requests are made, this proposal would not be sufficient.
The requirement of good faith is necessary to prevent companies
from taking advantage of greater American restraint in seeking docu-
ments by "hiding" them in countries that offer greater protection
against disclosure. 228 An attempt to shield documents would mean that
224 Atwood has recommended that a showing of a particularized need for extrater-
ritorial discovery be required. See Atwood, supra note 1, at 356. The Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States already requires courts to take various
factors into account before ordering extraterritorial discovery. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 42, § 420(1)(c). This requirement, however, has not had sufficient impact.
Cutler has suggested that the current standard, mere relevance of likelihood of
leading to admissible evidence for seeking documents abroad, is incompatible with com-
ity. See Cutler, supra note 54, at 282.
225 See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 16.5
(discussing strict enforcement of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity with respect to horizontal arrangements) (3d ed. 1982); id. § 16.9 (discussing
German, French, Dutch, Belgian, Irish, and Danish antitrust laws).
226 See, e.g., Mazaroff, Surviving the Avalanche: Defendant's Discovery in Title
VII Litigation, 4 LITIGATION 14, 14 (Fall 1977); McElroy, Federal Pre-Trial Proce-
dure in an Antitrust Suit, 31 Sw. L.J. 649, 681 (1977).
227 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Mar. 1978) 6-11 (limit dis-
covery to "claims or defenses" of the parties), cited in NATIONAL COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 55, at 53 n.3; LITIGATION SECTION, ABA, REPORT OF THE SPE-
CIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE 2-31 (Oct. 1977) (limit dis-
covery to "issues raised"), cited in NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 55, at
53 n.3; NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 55, at 46 (endorsing adoption of
either proposal).
228 A similar approach is currently used to determine sanctions for noncompliance
with discovery orders. See Cutler, supra note 54, at 285-86.
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the first condition-that the documents be available in the United
States-would not be met, and that the second condi-
tion-admissibility-would not apply. Thus, bad faith would involve
the company in expensive litigation that it probably would lose, because
the court is not likely to be receptive to arguments that foreign judicial
sovereignty must be respected where it is deliberately used as a tool to
flaunt American justice.
Furthermore, the court should not grant a request for documents
located abroad unless it concludes that the discovery methods to be used
do not, on their face, violate the laws of the country in which the infor-
mation will be gathered. This suggestion has a dual purpose. It re-
quires the court to monitor discovery requests, thus lending the requests
the aura of authoritative government approval and making them more
palatable abroad.229 It also forces the parties to investigate foreign law
on discovery methods, a matter that may be is overlooked, with poten-
tially serious consequences for the attorneys involved.230 Because Amer-
ican courts cannot be expected to be versed in all the subtleties of for-
eign discovery methods, the provision is satisfied if the proposed
methods appear to be in accord with foreign law.
An alternative to the approach suggested above is that of Senate
Bill 2164, proposed by the Reagan administration in March 1986,
which provided that motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter juris-
diction and motions to dismiss pursuant to the jurisdictional rule of
reason be decided before the case is allowed to proceed, and which lim-
ited discovery to information "directly related" to the motions.2  Like
the suggestion described above, these provisions were intended to reduce
the intrusiveness of discovery in cases in which the court lacks jurisdic-
tion over the claim. They might also reduce the objections to taking
jurisdiction on the basis of effects, because the infringement on national
sovereignty caused by American courts ordering the production of docu-
ments located abroad would be less frequent.
It is not clear, however, what effect such a provision would have.
" See 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 20, § 15.11 (discussing need
for greater judicial role in controlling discovery in private antitrust suits involving for-
eign commerce); NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 55, at 59-66, 81-87
(recommending that judges have more involvement in controlling discovery in complex
antitrust cases).
13" French and Swiss law provide penal sanctions for those who attempt to use
unauthorized methods of discovery. See Borel & Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles
to Obtaining Evidence in France for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L
LAW. 35, 45 (1979); Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and
a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 520 (1953).
231 S. 2164, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 132 CONG. REc. S2288
(daily ed. Mar. 7, 1986).
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A finding of the requisite effect on American commerce may require
inquiry into how the corporation in question operates, how it competes
with others, and its place in the market in question. A finding that
exercising jurisdiction is consistent with international comity may re-
quire inquiry into the location of the conduct in question, the intent
behind the alleged acts, the interaction between the conduct and foreign
laws and policies to determine whether a defendant induced a foreign
government to pass a law in its favor, and the structure of the interna-
tional market. These inquiries are likely to require substantial
discovery.
At present, courts prefer to complete the massive discovery neces-
sary in antitrust claims before deciding jurisdictional questions. 3 2
Whether jurisdictional questions can be resolved without full discovery
is likely to vary from case to case. The typically generous attitude of
American courts toward discovery, and the incentive for plaintiffs to
link jurisdictional and substantive questions so as to request broad dis-
covery, may well render these provisions nullities. The suggestion pro-
posed by this Comment, on the other hand, requires the court to make
inquiries that can be answered without extensive investigation into dif-
ficult jurisdictional issues and that are governed by relatively clear
standards.
This suggestion does not address the question of appropriate sanc-
tions when a blocking law prevents a party from providing the infor-
mation sought.23 ' It looks only to the actual methods of discovery in the
hope that substantial compliance with foreign law and policy on discov-
ery will obviate the need to address the question of sanctions. If
adopted, this suggestion would benefit both American business and
American foreign relations. As defendants, American corporations
would not be forced to choose between obeying a discovery order or a
blocking law. As plaintiffs, they would benefit from the increased likeli-
hood that discovery requests, though limited in scope, would be an-
swered. American foreign relations would benefit to the extent that an
irritant to the United States's trading partners would be reduced, and
' District court judges are reluctant to dismiss cases before extensive discovery
has taken place. See Hearings, supra note 2, at I (testimony of Abraham Sofaer, Legal
Advisor, Department of State).
2" The principal case in this area is Societe Internationale Pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), which limited the
circumstances under which a plaintiff's complaint may be dismissed for failure to pro-
duce. This case provided no affirmative test, however, and later decisions have not in-
terpreted it as barring sanctions where a blocking law forbids compliance with a pro-
duction order. See generally 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 20, §§ 15.19
to .20 (discussing case law on sanctions); Cutler, supra note 54, at 284-88 (same).
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the promulgation and use of blocking laws checked. Finally, the ap-
proach to discovery that this suggestion embodies is accepted abroad
and renders the risks involved in an American antitrust suit more pre-
dictable, thus strengthening the international legal system.
Suggestion 5: Damages: Restricting Treble Damage Awards
Plaintiffs in antitrust suits involving foreign commerce shall
recover only actual damages when the defendant has been
compelled or actively encouraged by a government to take
the acts complained of, unless the enforcement of the anti-
trust laws of the United States would thereby be substan-
tially impaired.
A defendant has been compelled or actively encouraged
by a government when its acts were required by law, regula-
tion, or administrative or judicial order, or when its acts are
part of a longstanding industry-wide practice that exists with
government encouragement.
The enforcement of the antitrust laws of the United
States is substantially impaired by practices dearly aimed at
the United States market and clearly condemned by United
States law at the time they took place.
This proposal addresses three concerns: the charge that treble
damages are punitive, the argument that national sovereignty is violated
when a private party is held liable for acts done under government
auspices, and the belief that it is unfair to impose substantial penalties
on defendants when the law is unclear, as is the case in some areas of
antitrust law. At the same time, this proposal protects the American
interest in enforcement of its antitrust laws.
Treble damages are considered punitive by some because it is
thought that they require a defendant to pay more than the damage
inflicted.2 4 As a matter of economic accuracy, it is not clear that this is
the case. Empirical studies of the treble damage remedy have not
' Non-economists have also expressed criticism of treble damages. They claim
that the treble damage remedy exerts pressure on innocent defendants to settle, espe-
cially when combined with the current state of uncertainty in substantive antitrust law.
Furthermore, this remedy makes it difficult for plaintiffs to vindicate their rights, given
the judiciary's hesitance to impose substantial penalties on defendants for conduct de-
fendants reasonably considered legal. See TREBLE DAMAGES STUDY, supra note 83, at
2. In addition, the treble damage remedy is a possible reason for the lack of develop-
ment of antitrust law and for the trivialization of antitrust suits. See 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 91, § 331b2.
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yielded conclusive results.2" 5 One may argue that the damages suffered
by the plaintiff understate the total harm caused by anticompetitive be-
havior. That does not mean, of course, that three is the proper multi-
plier or that the extent of damage suffered by the plaintiff is the proper
starting point in assessing damages. It does, however, suggest that
something more than actual plaintiff's damages may be appropriate.
Numerous suggestions have been made for limiting the treble
damage remedy. 3 One argument is that when this remedy was ini-
tially enacted, the barriers to recovery by plaintiffs were much higher
than they are at present, and therefore, the current system is heavily
weighted in favor of plaintiffs.23 7 While this criticism is historically ac-
curate, it is difficult to determine quantitatively whether the system
does, indeed, favor plaintiffs. But widespread dissatisfaction with the
remedy should not be ignored. This proposal suggests that, in some
cases, it is appropriate to consider a lower measure of damages.
One such case involves the situation in which a foreign govern-
ment compels or actively encourages anticompetitive behavior as part of
its national economic policy. 3 Every nation has the right to structure
"I An empirical study of price fixing in the bread industry concluded that the
threat of treble damages is necessary to effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. The
study found that the Justice Department's attempts to end collusion were not effective
until private (treble damage) class action suits, which can "piggyback" onto successful
government suits, became available. Block, Nold & Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Anti-
trust Enforcement, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 429 (1981), discussed in TREBLE DAMAGES
STUDY, supra note 83, at 22. A more recent and comprehensive study, the Georgetown
Private Antitrust Litigation Project, suggests that treble damages are not an accurate
measure of damages, but gives no estimate of the extent to which they over- or under-
penalize defendants.
238 See TREBLE DAMAGES STUDY, supra note 83, at 42-44; 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 91, § 331b3.
231 Changes in statutory law that favor plaintiffs include § 4 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982), and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h, 18a, 66 (1982). Judicial interpretations of laws that favor
plaintiffs include denial of the "pass-on" defense, see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977); TREBLE DAMAGES STUDY, supra note 83, at 7-9, 27-28, and the reform of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which has introduced liberal pleading and discovery
rules. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text. For discussion of other pro-plain-
tiff aspects of the antitrust laws, see supra note 102.
'" Active encouragement is included in this proposal because governments may
set policy through means less formal than laws and regulations. The relationship be-
tween Japanese business and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
("MITI"), an immensely powerful bureaucracy that coordinates policy governing Jap-
anese business, provides one example. Another example involves the situation that ex-
isted in Switzerland at the time of United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information
Center, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), in which producer as-
sociations were governed by self-created, but government-encouraged, regulations. See
Maw, United States Antitrust Law Abroad-The Enduring Problem of Extraterrito-
riality, 40 ANTITRUST L.J. 796, 797-98 (1970-71).
[Vol. 135:1003
1987] ANTITRUST SUITS INVOLVING FOREIGN COMMERCE 1051
its economy as it sees fit. But it also has a nonlegal obligation to the
international community to promote the development of the interna-
tional legal order by avoiding conflicts, particularly those that arise
over perceived violations of territorial integrity.2"'
American courts have created the doctrine of foreign government
compulsion in recognition of the delicate line that must be drawn when
this right and this obligation to the international community conflict.
Compulsion by a foreign government is, in theory, a complete defense
to a claim under the antitrust laws. The doctrine has been interpreted
very narrowly, however,uo probably because the consequences of a suc-
cessful defense on these grounds are so drastic. The proposal suggested
by this Comment is an attempt to broaden the scope of the doctrine.
This proposal would serve to increase recognition of the right of other
countries to carry out their economic policy, without removing all in-
centive for those countries to avoid causing harm to the United States.
It is hoped that the language of this proposal and the relative mildness
of the consequences of finding that the defendant was compelled or ac-
tively encouraged by its government will encourage the courts to inter-
pret the defense more broadly.
The defense of foreign government compulsion is inappropriate,
however, when a foreign country has compelled anticompetitive behav-
ior intended to harm American commerce. Such behavior is in conflict
with the principle that nations should refrain from causing harm to
other nations, and it is reasonable to impose the full force of the law in
such cases. Care must be taken to ensure that this clause does not be-
come a loophole into which every case fits. Such a result can be avoided
by legislative history that states that actual intent must be proved or
that the effects on the American market must be greater than those on
the market of the nations in question.
Full treble damages should apply only when substantive antitrust
law clearly condemns the practices in question at the time they took
place. This condition is based on the belief that defendants should not
be severely punished for conduct they reasonably believed to be legal at
239 International law prohibiting the violation of territorial integrity has as yet
become established in only a few areas: prohibitions on pollution of the environment,
see Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 Int'l Arb. Awards 1911 (1941) and prohibitions on
the use of aggression, see U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4), are two examples. In the area of
economic coexistence international law is developing within the context of international
organizations. See P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, THE CHANGING STRUcTuRE OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1981).
240 Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D.
Del. 1970), is the only reported case in which the decision rested on foreign sovereign
compulsion grounds.
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the time it occurred. Lack of clarity is a common domestic and foreign
criticism of American antitrust laws. 241 Where it is unclear whether an
act is prohibited, reducing the penalty for committing it is unlikely to
substantially impair enforcement of the laws.
One objection that may be made to this proposal is that it unfairly
distinguishes between defendants. It potentially lightens the liability
and, therefore, the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws on defendants
engaged in foreign commerce as opposed to those engaged solely in do-
mestic commerce. Furthermore, some defendants engaged in foreign
commerce will be subject to reduced liability whereas others will not. A
second possible criticism is that this suggestion carves a hole in the stat-
utory scheme, thereby increasing the inequities of current antitrust
enforcement.
The injustice of distinguishing among defendants engaged in for-
eign commerce is not likely to be substantial. The requirement that an
award of actual damages not substantially impair the enforcement of
United States antitrust laws will ensure that defendants who engage in
behavior that inflicts substantial harm on competition within the
United States will suffer accordingly. To the extent that a defendant
has not substantially harmed competition within the United States, the
harm to enforcement of the antitrust laws by reducing the damages to
be paid is less. In short, those who benefit from this provision are likely
to be those least reprehensible.
The injustice caused by distinguishing between defendants engaged
in foreign commerce and those engaged solely in domestic commerce
also is not substantial. The intent behind this exemption is to impose
only actual damages in those instances where national interests are bet-
ter served by reducing or avoiding conflicts with other nations. Such
cases are likely to be those in which a foreign government has sanc-
tioned the behavior of the defendant in question, because a foreign na-
tion's interest is most likely to be adversely affected where it has deter-
mined that the national interest requires the promotion of
anticompetitive behavior. Imposing actual damages on defendants car-
rying out foreign national policy does not unreasonably discriminate
against defendants engaged solely in domestic commerce, because de-
fendants not engaged in foreign commerce are not subject to conflicting
national economic regulation.
Nor is the harm done to the statutory scheme significant. The an-
titrust laws are not a well-crafted whole that would suffer irreparable
'"1 See 2 J. ArWooD & K. B wsT-ER, supra note 20, § 18.06. But see 1 B.
HAWK, supra note 13, at 15-17 (concluding that much of this uncertainty has been
eliminated by recent developments).
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harm if a piece is carved out. There are numerous blanket exemptions
from the antitrust laws,242 and Congress has already limited recover-
able damages to actual damages in several contexts.243
Finally, substantial benefits are likely to accrue to American for-
eign affairs and American business if this proposal is implemented.
The co-existence of American treble damage awards and foreign
clawback statutes indicates that if the antitrust enforcement conflict
continues to worsen, American businesses with operations abroad may
find that as plaintiffs in antitrust suits, their recoveries are reduced to
actual or no damages. A plaintiff's damage award may be, in effect,
nullified if the defendant has no property within the United States and
foreign nations refuse to enforce United States treble damage awards or
allow recovery of the punitive portion of the damages under clawback
statutes. American business defendants will also benefit from this pro-
posal. The existence of clawback laws provides incentive for plaintiffs
to sue American defendants rather than foreign ones. Furthermore,
even when both American and foreign defendants are sued, joint and
several liability may result in American defendants paying even more
than treble the damages inflicted on the plaintiff.
Although the proposal suggested here does not directly protect
against the above scenarios, it will help to break the cycle of escalating
conflicts by showing American readiness to accommodate foreign inter-
ests and by reducing the number of treble damage awards against for-
eign defendants. By setting guidelines for when actual and treble dam-
ages should be recovered, and by discouraging the proliferation and
application of clawback laws, the proposal suggested herein will im-
prove the environment within which American business operates
abroad.
Similarly, American foreign affairs also may benefit. Foreign
countries object to the treble damage remedy both because it is an
award of punitive damages by a civil court, and because it is used to
enforce laws whose substantive content conflicts with local government
242 Julian von Kalinowski lists 59 exemptions to the antitrust laws. See 16E J.
VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 136, at § 44-02[3][d]. Some examples include 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (1982) (exemption for agricultural cooperatives, labor unions, etc.); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1804 (1982) (exemption for newspapers); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(1982) (allowing bank mergers to be attacked under the antiturst laws, but mandating
the use of the standards of the government agency that approved the merger to deter-
mine the anticompetitive effects).
14S See Pfizer Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982) (limiting foreign govern-
ments suing in their sovereign capacity to actual damages); National Cooperative Re-
search Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 4303 (Supp. 111 1985) (limiting antitrust recoveries
for joint research and development ventures to actual damages if specified notification
procedures have been followed).
1053
1054 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
policy. Treble damages serve to exacerbate existing tensions. 244 This
proposal is intended to help minimize the conflict and to permit disa-
greement among nations to focus on the substantive rather than the
procedural aspects of antitrust policy. In this way, nations can move
closer to resolving contested issues of substantive law.
CONCLUSION
The international conflicts raised by enforcement of American an-
titrust laws abroad, although they will not be completely eliminated by
anything short of an international treaty, certainly can be mitigated in
an effort to promote international comity. This Comment makes pro-
posals that, if implemented, would serve to alleviate the tensions caused
by antitrust suits involving foreign commerce. First, American courts
should exercise restraint in asserting jurisdiction over cases involving
foreign actors. Jurisdiction should be based on proof by the plaintiff
that the allegedly anticompetitive acts in question in fact had "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effects" on American commerce.
Additionally, the doctrine of forum non conveniens should apply to
such antitrust suits. Second, once jurisdiction is asserted, this Comment
proposes that parties limit their evidence gathering activities abroad.
This would lessen the likelihood that the sovereignty of foreign govern-
ments will be undermined, thereby encouraging such governments to
aid in the search for documents located abroad. Finally, the range of
potential damage awards should be broadened to take into account situ-
ations in which foreign governments compelled or actively encouraged
the performance of allegedly anticompetitive acts. These proposals
would promote more effective enforcement of American antitrust laws
abroad and would better protect international comity. In a world in
which no nation acts truly independently, these goals deserve
consideration.
244 See ABA Probe, supra note 4, at 262.
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